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India's heavy duties on capital goods biur the incentive signals
from the tariff structure. In practice, that structure favors import
substitution of intermediate products from heavy industry and
discourages exports.  The complex protection structure should
be simplified, with priority to slashing the duties on capital
goods.
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This paper --- a product of thc Industry and Finance Operations Division, A  .ia Regional Office, Country
Department IV (India) --- is part of a larger effort to undcrtakc a comprehensive review of intlia's trade
regimc and( oxlicics  and  to  man  kerecomnmncndations  for liieral  /.ait011  of tradc policics. Copics are available
free froni thc World Bank,  8  18  I11  Strect NW, Washington DC 2()33.  Please contact Francois Eltori, room
DI-049  , cxtension 80324 (39 pages with graphs and tables).
Some 60 industrial projects (chiefly in tihc  producingi  intermcdiates and inputs for down-
chemical and cnginecring subsectors) finainced  stream subsectcrs -- and witiin cach subsector.
by thc Developmnent  Finance Institutions in India
in 1988 and 1989 were analyzed. The major  Nominal protection rates (as reflected by
finding is that levying the heaviest dutics on  domestic to world price ratios) averaging 40-50
imported capital goods has deeply distorted  percent, are substantially lower than average
industrial incentives anid  harmed industrial  tarif'f  collection rates (c()-70 percent) and much
competitiveness and exports.  lower than ol'ficial tarif'f;s  (120-140 percent).  The
wide variations in protection rcflect a complex
With taniffs  on capital goods averaginig  80  system comprising many exemptions and ad hoc
percent (except for clcctronic industries equip-  tariffs.
mnerit  which pays about 4() percent), Indian
projects are generally 40 to 50 percent more  Tariff'reform is urgently necded.  T'ariffs
;spensivc  than thyc \ould  bc under f'ree  tradc,  should primarily providce  protection arid incen-
and( Up tO 80 perCet  ntore expensive  in capital-  \ives,  V ith only' a seconidaryv unction  of gcnerat-
iniitesive projects.  ing pub!ic revcrnuC.  First, tariffs should be
slashed,  and  imports  liberalizied, on capital
'I hc  high  iu esint  cosLs  require  a comnill-  goods,  tO\; ard a un;lornim  tariif  of 15  percent  and
sator)  ef'fc  cti\  c  roictlionl  aB erlging  3() percent  f-ull cxcmiption  for projects  exponing  at Icast  halt
to allow  industrial  pIrojX  ds  to carn  rcturns at least  ol output.  [or  intncniediates  and othcr inputs.
equal to  lihose available  undter trc  trade.  I  Ic lo-  most  tari lf exempt ions should  be eliminated.
cvc r, about  haiil the' projects  igenral  lv those  import  regirreCS  unifiLd, anll(d  larilfs  aligned  on
producinig final  goods)  rccix\e  cf'L,ctive p)rotec-  :ollcction  rates tom,ard rc(luced levels  averaTgingt
tionl significatlilk  lo'.cr  than111  thle  com,)pensator\  .40  percent.
elf'cliVye protect ion,  and gcncrai  loAer profits
than tiose  of foreign  comi  petitors  Public  rccnuC  should he  generated  increas-
inolv  throughl trade-nCuiral  instrunitnts  (profit
Nomllinal  proicction  \'arics  Awidel\  belt  cen  ta;Xs aInd itiirCet  taxes suchi as  O(M \A''  and
lh,ectciors  - frl'01om  25 pericent for  'itn.:l  goods  colnsumliption  VAT ).
idi(ustries  to 610  to oS perceni  lor indu  trics
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1.  The  Industry  and  Finance  Division  of  che  India  Department  of  the  World  Bank
(AS4IF)  undertook  in 1989-1990  an in-depth  review  and analysis  of the  Trade
Regime  of  India  and  of  its  effects  and  implications  on  the  performance  of  India's
manufacturing  sector.  Vast  amounts  of  statistics,  other  analyses  and  literature
were assembled  to that  purpose,  with  a view  to recapitulate  and  synthesize  the
available  knowledge  on  the  subject  and  to  draw  a  relatively  comprehensive  picture
of the  protection  structure,  growth,  cost competitiveness,  external  trade  and
structural  evolution  in each  of the  major  subsectors  of Indian  manufacturing.
Prominent  among  the  available  sources  of information  and  prior  analysis  were  the
Bank's 1987 CEM, Garry Pursell's  Review  of Effective  Protection  of Indian
Industry  (mimeo,  unpublished),  and  ICICI's  1985  study  of export-performance  of
ICICI-financed  companies.
2.  A significant  obstacle,  however,  in carrying  out the  AS4IF's  review  was
the scarcity  of updated data on prices, costs and profitability  in Indian
industries  relative  to international  markets  and  comparators.  The  most  recent
years  for  which  the  other  available  analyses  and  data  were  providing  reasonable
estimates  of  prices,  protection  and  profitability  in  industry  were  covezing  the
period  1980-1986.  Moreover,  in  computing  their  estimates  with  the  best  possible
accuracy,  these  other  studies  paid  less  attention  to  the  analysis  of  the  internal
workings  and dynamics  of the protection  structure,  i.e. the degree  to which
protection  feeds  upon  itself  and  calls  for  further  protection  when  one  group  or
category  of products  (e.g.  ,  intermediates,  capital  goods)  is used or further
processed  by a downstream  subsector. The  purpose  of this  Working  Paper  is to
contribute  further  to the  existing  studies  by analyzing  the internal  dynamics
of  the  protection  structure  on  the  basis  of  recent  data  valid  for  the  Late  1980s.
General  Purpose  and  ADDroach
3.  Up-to-date  information  and data  of the  type  required  for  estimating  the
Competitiveness  and the  Effective  Protection  (in  particular,  relative  domestic
to international  prices  for  inputs  and  outputs)  of industry  normally  requires
lengthy and extensive  surveys of a  representative  sample of manufacturing
enterprises. Due to time  constraints  principally,  such survey  could  not  be
undertaken. As the  best substitute,  detailed  data  of the  type required  were
extracted  fro-  a sample  of some  60  appraisal  reports  prepared  by ICICI  and  IDBI
for  projects  which  they  finaneed  in  1988  and  1989. These  projects  were  made  in
25  manufacturing  subsectors  (as  ciefined  in the 115 - subsector  classification
of the  Indian  economy,  which  comprises  a total  of 66  manufacturing  subsectors),
focussing principally  on  the metal and engineering  industries  (including
electronics)  and to a lesser  extent  on the chemical  and related  inoustries
(synthetic  fibers  and  textiles,  phrrmaceuticals).
4.  The project  data were assembled  with a  view to providing  quantitative
indications,  and  whenever  possible  answers,  to  the  following  questions:-2-
(a)  What are  tr_  respective  profitabilities  of  the domestic and
international  markets  for  Indian  industries?;
(b)  Hov  much  of Indian  industry's  lack  of international  competitiveness
stems  for  the  extra  costs  paid  for  inputs  (in  the  form  of  duties  on
imported  inputs  or high  prices  for  domestic  supplies)?;
xc)  What  is  the  impact  of India's  investment  costs,  grossed-up  by  duties
and taxes  on imported  equipment  and  by higher  prices  of domestic
machinery,  on  the  Value  Added  and  the  Effective  Protection  of  Indian
industry?;
(d)  What is  the  minimum  level  of nominal  protection  required  by Indian
industry  to  compensate  for  the  extra  costs  paid  for  its  inputs  (item
b) and  for  its  investments  (item  c)?;  and
(e)  To which  extent  are the actual  nominal  and effective  protections
received  by  Indian industry  in concordance  vith the levels  of
protection  stemming  from  items  (c)  and (d)  above?
5.  The  results  of  the  analysis  presented  below  should  be interpreted  with  sowe
qualifications.  Firstly,  the  parameters  and  data  used  in  DFI  project  appraisal
reports  tend  inherently  to  err  to  the  favorable  side  with  respect  to  comparative
prices  (domestic  versus  CIF) for  the  projects'  outputs. Secondly,  the  projec-
tions implicitly  assume that the projects  will be operated  efficiently  to
minimize  production  costs (inputs,  labor,  capacity  operating  ratio,  ...).  In
practice, actual production  costs are often higher than projected during
appraisal,  and  domestic  ex-factory  prices  are  then  increased  as  much  as  permitted
by  domestic  competition  and  the  degree  of  protection  provided  by  the  Quantitative
Restrictions  and the  protection  tariffs  levied  on competing  imports  in  India.
For  these  reasons,  the  data  are  most  likely  to  underestimate  the  actual  domestic
profitability,  the price uncompetitiveness,  and the effective and nominal
protections  presently  experienced  by Indian  industries.  i/  Nevertheless,  they
provide  an indication  of the incentives  and disincentives  steoing  from the
protection  structure  as they  are  perceived  ex-ante  by the  project  promoters  and
financiers.  In  this  sense,  they  should  provide  useful  indications  and  benchmarks
for  a reasonable  assessment  of the issues  raised  in  para.  3 above.
1/  The  same  favorable  bias  is  a  first  factor  for  underestimating  the  effective
protection.  Moreover,  available  data  ef  appraisal  reports  could  not  permit
to separate  out the  excise  (or  CVD) taxes  from  the  ex-factory  or landed
prices  of inputs  to  be  purchased  for  the  projects'  operations.  Estimating
and separating  out  such  excise  or CVD  taxes  on the  basis  of the  official
tax  schedules  would  have  been  misleading,  due  to  the  pervasive  exemptions
and  ad-hoc  rates  applied  in India,  and  was not  done.  To this  extent,  the
comparative  prices  of inputs  used  in  the  Effective  Protection  computations
are slightly  overestimated,  and the  resulting  Effective  Protection  rates
are  further  underestimated.-3-
ComRarative  Profitabilities  of the  Domestic  and  International  Markets
6.  About one-fourth  of the sample  projects  were projected  to export  a
significant  share  of  their  output  (including  one  100%  Export  Oriented  Unit),  and
6 other  projects  (one-tenth  of the  sample)  would  export  a  marginal  share  (5%  to
10%). Only  half  of the  significant  exporters  show  a favorable  (i.e.,  below  or
close to 1) ex-factory  to export (FOB)  price ratio (the  Nominal  Protection
Coefficient,  or NPC)  2/  for  their  output. O.her  significant  exporters  (mostly
in chemical  and associated  industries)  have ur.favorable  domestic/FOB  price
ratios,  ranging  between  1.4  and 2.3 (Annex  I).  The marginal  exportets  have
output  NPCs  ranging  between  1.14  and  1.84. Among  the  non-exporters,  a  group  of
8  potential  exporters (see para. 9) have favorable  output NPCs below or
marginally  above 1 (0.80  to 1.14),  and all other  non-exporters  (half  or the
sample)  have  price  ratios  ranging  between  1.20  and  1.94.
7.  Production  costs  per  unit  of output  were  determined  for  each  project,  on
a full  cost  basis  as well as on a marginal  basis  (i.e.,  before  depreciatian,
interest  and administrative  overheads). Profitability  of the  domestic  market
(as  percent  of  output  prices)  was  determined  over  the  full  production  cost  (i.e,
domestic  price  minus full  unit  production  cost). The  full  cost  profitabi.ity
and  the  marginal  profitability  (over  the  marginal  production  cost)  were  computed
for  exporters  and  non-exporters,  as  % of  t'he  international  price  (FOB  in  cases
of export,  CIF otherwise). The results,  detailed  in Annex I, are summarized
below:
Table  1:  Craprative  Profitabitity  of  Damstic  wnd  Internatiowal  Markets
Export  Sawipi  Export  to  Output  FuLl  Cost  Profitability  I()  Marginal
Category  Share  JS  Output  CS)  MPC  Dom_stic  InternationaL  Profitability
(X)
Lice  PricC  of  Intnlt  Price
None  53  0  1.55  11.2  41.2  -12.2
Potentias  14  0  1.00  14.7  12.2  38.5
Marginat  10  8.0  1.39  0.7  *24.9  1.3
Significant  23  45.9  1.42  16.4  13.0  15.5
OveraLt  100  11.7  1 43  12.9  -24.6  3.6
Note:  Unless  otherwise  specified,  aLL  indicators  in  this  and  folLowing  tablee  are  simple  (ureighted)  avcrag".
Source:  Annex  I
8.  The  projected  price  competitiveness,  as  measured  by the  Output  NPC,  does
not  appear  to  constitute  the  explanatory  factor  for  the  decision  to  export. The
output  price  ratio is similarly  high (1.4  to 1.5) for the  categories  of non-
exporters and exporters.  The only difference,  which may carry the full
explanation,  between  these  two  categories  is  the  marginal  cost  profitabilitv  of
international  prices:  -12%  for non-exporters,  +15% for  significant  exporters.
Moreover,  CCS income  increases  the  marginal  cost  profitability  of significant
2/  The  economic  mechanlsms  by which  these  price  ratios  (NPCs)  are  generated
are not analyzed  in this note.  Suffice  to say  here that  NPCs are the
result  of the various effects  of import  Quantitative  Restrictions  and
tariffs  relative  to the  degree  of domestic  competition  and  supply/demand
balance  permitted  by the  regulatory  policies.-4-
exporters  by only 2.6 percentage  points  on average.  j/  This confirms  the
analysis  and  findings  of  the  Bank' Export  Strategy  Report  (6663-IN,  Mar-h  1987)
which  established  that Indian  industry  generally  exports  a marginal  share  of
output  when  the  export  international  price  permits  a  reasonable  profitability
at  marginal  cost. The  category  of  marginal  exporters  earns  a  small  marginal  cost
profitability  of 1.3%  on FOB  prices,  and  does  not  expect  to receive  additional
CCS income. These  levels  of export  profitability  as anticipated  in 1988-1989
compare  favorably  with those  prevailing  in 1978-1980  as  recorded  by ICICI  for
a sample  of industries.  !/
9.  The  seconG category of  Table  1,  dinominated  potential exporters,
constitutes  some  sort  of  anomaly.  They  are  characterized  by  having  not  only  the
most favorable  price  competitiveness  (averagj  NPC  of 1),  but also  a full  cost
profitability  over  international  prices  which  is  simil&r  to  their  profitability
in  the  Jomestic  market  (12%  versus  14.7%). Nevertheless,  thi  appraisal  reports
for  these  projects  do not indicate  plans  or even intentions  to export. These
projects are  generally in engineering  industries,  with some in chemical
industries  based  on local  primary  resources. A major  characteristic  of these
projects  is  their  relatively  high  Value  Added  content  (their  VD%/Output  ratio  in
international  prices  average 54%, as compared  to 32% for the other  project
categories),  which  givss  them  more  room  for  cutting  down  on the  cost  components
of  Value  Added. As  a  matter  of  tact,  all  projects  of  this  category  have  negative
Effective  Rates  of Protection  (EPRS),  averaging  -29%  as opposed  to an average
+50% for the  other  project  categories  (Annex  I),  which  suggest  high operating
efficiency  (according  to appraisal  report  projections). The reasons  for  not
exporting  nor  considering  exports  are  not  mentioned  iri  the  appraisal  reports  for
the..e  projects,  and  might  be  case-specific.  They  may  relate  to  quality  standards
and issues,  particularly  for final  engineering  goods.  This apparent  anomaly
would  deserve  during  a  subsequent  mission  some  investigation  with  the  DFIP  which
might  lead  to  worthwhile  findings.
impact  of Input  Costs  on ComDetitiveness  and  ProfitabilitX
10.  A major source  of uncompetitiveness  in Indian  industries  has been the
higher  prices  paid  for  operating  inputs  relatively  to  international  prices. The
main  reasons  for  these  higher  prices  are: (i)  the  tariff  duties  paid  on  imported
inputs; (ii)  the  uncompetitive  prices  of  domestic  supplies;  and (iii)  the  non-
deductible  excise  taxes. On average,  inputs  used  by the  projects  have prices
2/  These low levels  of CCS, as explicitly  recorded  in the  DFIs'  appraisal
reports,  are  much  lower  than  the  official  CCS  rates. It  is  quite  possible
that  the  exporting  projects  will  actually  receive  CCS incomes  higher  than
those  taken  into  account  by the  DFIs.  Nevertheless,  the  high NPCs and
negative  profitability  of some projects  in the category  of substantial
exporters  cast doubt  on their real intentions  and future  achievements
regarding  exports. In  particular,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  six  projects
with  highly  negative  profitabilities  of  exports  on full  cost  could  export
50% to 75% of their  output.  The reasons  why these  projects  intend  to
export  such  major  shares  might  be case-specific  and  would  deserve  further
investigation.
iJ  Export  Performance  of ICICI - Financed  Companies  (1978/79  to 1980/81),
Bombay,  1985.- 5 -
49%  above  international  prices. The  d,  estic  to  international  price  ratio  (NPC)
for  inputs  decreases  from  1.58  in  tha  .. irst  category  (non-exporters)  to  1.38  for
substantial  exporters,  as shown  below:
Tflse 2:  Iict  of  IrPut CoStS  rd  Taxes  am Profitability
Export  Averi  Inpujt Taxes  as X  Adjusted ProfitabiLity  /g of
Category  IrFout NPC  of  gutout  Intnt.  Price  Internatioml  Price  over:
Ful  k  Cost  1laralnAt Cost
Mor-q  1.58  39.0  -0.7  28.2
Potential  1.43  14.6  30.5  56.8
Marginal  1.413  27.3  2.2  28.7
Significant  1.38  21.1  8.1  36.7
Overall  1.49  30.3  6.0  34.2
/I  Adjusted by  remving  taxes  x  price  surcharge  from  irput  costs.
Source:  Arwex  II.
The  additional  costs  stemming  from  the  higher  input  prices  represent  on average
30%  of the  output's  international  price.  This  cost  handicap  is  significantly
higher for the non-exporters  (39%),  and markedly  lower for the potential
exporters  (only  14.6%)  due to their  high  Value  Added  content  and  their  use  of
relatively  cheap  domestic  resource-based  inputs  (e.g.,  Maize,  Aluminum).
11.  A simulation  of the  "tax-free"  production  costs  (excluding  the  surcharges
paid  for inputs,  i.e.,  the  tariffs  on imported  inputs,  the  price  differentials
on  local ones, and  the non-deductible  excise taxes) indicates  that the
competitiveness  and profitability  of the projects  relative  to international
prices  would  be greatly  enhanced  by eliminating  these  surcharges.  Practically
all  projects  which  had  a  negative  marginal  profitability  on international  prices
would  generare  a  positive  tax-free  marginal  profitability  under  such  conditions.
Furthermore,  the pro?ortion  of projects  which would ear  from international
prices  a positive  profit  on their  full  production  cost  wo, i  triple  (from  20%
to 63%).  In the category  of non-exporters.  this proportion  would increase
dramatically  from  0 to 50%,  i.e.,  half  the  projents  which  have  no prospect  nor
potential  for  export  under  the  present  circumstances  could  become  substantial
exporters  with a reasonable  positive  profit  margin  if they  could  procure  their
istputs  at  international  prices. It  confirms  the  major  finding  and  recommendation
of the  Zxport  Strategy  Report,  regarding  the  critical  importance  of access  to
inputs  at international  prices  for  any  successful  export  policy.
Impact  of  Investment  Costs  on  Value  Added  and  Effective  Protection
12.  One  uncomoon  feature  of India's  protection  structure  is  the  high lerel  of
customs  tariffs  and  taxes  levied  on imported  capital  goods. Correlatively,  the
domestic  capital  goods  industry  supplies  the  rest  of the industrial  sector  at
prices  generally  higher  than  international  prices  for  comparable  capital  goods.
Moreover,  the  price  ratios  for  capital  goods  increase  with  the  technology  level
of capital  goods  and  equipment  (e.g.,  CNC  machine-tools  have NPCs exceeding  2
as compared  to 1.2-1.4  for  standard  machine-tools).
13.  The  high  cost  paid  by Indian  industrial  projects  for  their  capital  goods
(either  local  or imported)  implies  that  the  projects'  Value  Added  in domestic
prices  should  normally  include  a  larger  amount  of  capital  ren'imeration  (interest,
depreciation,  and  return  on fixed  assets). This  by itself  contributes,  ceterisparibus,  to  domestic  Value  Added  exceeding  Value  Added  at international  prices,
and  to a positive  Effective  Rate  of  Protection  (EPR). In  fact,  the  difference
between  a project's  financial  return  on  capital  (or  KRR)  in  domestic  prices  and
its  economic  return  (or  ERR)  in  international  prices  under  a free  trade  regime
is  shown  (see  Annex  III)  to  be approximately  expressed  as follows:
MRR - ERR - C. ((1  +  UJ)  - 1]
y  1-s
where:  MRR  is the  (pre-tax)  financial  internal  rate  of return;
- ERR  is the  economic  internal  rate  of return;
*  y is the  ratio  of the Investment  Cost in domestic  prices  to the
Investment  Cost  in  economic  (international)  prices  (this  ratio  is
greater  than  1 in India)  5./
- s  is  the share of  Labor  in  the Value Added  in economic
(international)  prices;
- EPR is the  project's  Effective  Rate  of Protection;  and
- C  is a  parameter specific to the project, i.e., depending
exclusively  on its  parameters  in  world  prices.
It  follows  (cf.  Annex III)  that in  order  to  ensure  to an investment  project  a
financial  pre-tax  return  at least  equal  to  the  economic  return  achievable  under
a  free trade regime, the project should receive a Compensatory  Effective
Protection  Rate (CEPR)  at least  equal  to:
CEPR - (l-s) (y-l)  i/
5/  The  factor  y  represents  in  fact  the  ratio  of  both  Investment  costs  required
per  physical  unit  of  output  (ton  or  piece). It  is  thus  the  product  of tuo
factors:  y  - x.z.  Factor  z, the  ratio  of Investment  costs  expressed  in
domestic  and international  prices,  captures  the  effects  of capital  goods
pricing  policies.  Factor  x captures  the effect  of x-inefficiencies  in
selecting  the  project's  production  capacity. In  subsectors  characterized
by substantial  economies of scale such as chemical iri'ustries,  the
investment  cost  per  ton  of  output,  and  thus  x, increases  by about  25%  each
time the capacity is  .reducea  by half.  Many projects in India have
capacities  far  below  international  standards  for  MES, and  have  x factors
significantly  above  1.  However,  in order  to focus  the  analfsis  on the
effects  of pricing  policies  for  capital  goods,  x is implicitly  taken  to
equal  1.
i/  This formula for  CEPR can be interpreted  by using one unit of VA in
international  prices  as  the  numeraire.  With  this  numeraire,  the  additional
VA in  domestic  prices  (CEPR)  compensates  for  the  renumeration  (l-s)  of  the
additional  investment  cost  (y-l). Moreover,  the  formula  for  CEPR  becomes
(1-s)  (y-l)+t,  whera t  is the share of  income tax in the VA  (in
international  prices),  if  the  after-ti-  financial  return  is  to  be  equalized
to  the  economic  return.. 7 -
Moreover,  e.he  quantities  KRR-ERR  and  EPR-CEPR  should  normally  have  the  seme  sign,
i.e.,  be simultaneously  positive  (or  negative).
14.  Factor  y in  India  is  significantly  above  1 for  several  reasons.  Firstl,
collected  tariff  duties  on imported  capital  goods  for  projects  are  high. They
average  some  70%  (Table  3). Only  electronics  industry  machinery  enjoys  a lower
tariff  duty  o  ;os.  Other  industries  pay  an  average  tariff  duty  of  80%  on  their
imported  equipment.  Secondl  locally procured capiLal goods, generally
representing  the  major  share  of equipment,  carry  purchase  prices  which  average
40%  aoove  international  prices. _1 Thirdly,  other  goods  and  materials  usnd  in
investment  projects,  cement  in particular,  are  charged  substantial  excise  and
other taxes  which increase  further  the financial  costs of invsstment  above
international  equivaler.ts.
15.  Two  estimates  of  factor  y  were  computed  for  the  sample  projects.  The  first
estimate  yl was computed  as the  ratio  of the  financial  investment  cost to the
same  adjusted  for  tariff  duties  on imported  equipment  and for  the  high  prices
of local  equipment  (the  first  two  factors  described  in  para.  14). This  factor
yl captures  only the impact  of the  high prices  of capital  goods. The second
estimate  y2  is  the  ratio  between  the  financial  investment  cost  and  the  'economic'
investment  cost  (used  for  ERR  computation),  and  captures  not  only  the  effect  of
capital  goods  prices  but also  the  price  distortions  of other  goods  and  factors
(e.g.,  cement,  interest  during  construction,  ...).  In  a  sense,  the factor  y2
represents  an upper  limit  of the  cumulative  effects  of all  forms  of  investment
taxation  in India.
16.  The  sample  data  confirm  that  investment  costs  in  India  are  significantly
higher  than  international  costs,  and  that  the taxation  of.  capital  goods  is  the
major  factor  accounting  for  that,  as illustrated  below:
Tabte  3: Effect  of  Investfint  Costs  on Effective  Protection  /I
Export  Tariff  (t)  on  Investwent  Cost  Factor  Cqpersatory  Actual  Projects  (X) in
Ca"soorv  Imorted Machinery  xi  x2  EPI (CEPR)  /b  EF  Excess/Shortfatl
(in  S)  (in  X)
None  74.2  1.41  1.55  30-41  60  65/35
PotentiaL  76.1  1.52  1.60  45-52  -27  0/100
marginaL  56.8  1.36  1.52  23-33  54  33/67
Significant  om 0  LR  2740  -jt  23/7
OveraLl  70.5  1.40  1.55  30-42  30  42/58
of  which.
ELectronics  3$.9  1.27  1.40  15-22  7
Others  (A  .)  78.7  1.43  1.58  34-46  34
/a  Actual  EPRs  In  this  tabLe  are  weighted  by  VAi
/b  The Lower (resp.  higher)  value  of the  indicated  range  correspords  to y1 (resp.  y2).
Source:  Arnea  IV
17.  These results  call for a number  of observations  and remarks.  First,
exporting  projects  (whether  marginal  or  significant  exporters)  pay  lower  duties
on  their imported  equipment than non-exporters  (about 60% versus 75% on
L'  Derived  from the conversion  factors  used by the DFIs for local  capital
goods  in their  ERR computations. This  1.4 ratio  is reasonably  close  to
our own estimates.average).  IL/  This  tariff  differentiation  has  an impact  on the  y factor,  which
is  slightly  but  significantly  lower  for  exporters  (yl  averages  1.34)  than  for
non-exporters  (average  1.45).  The yl tactor  indicates  that the  taxation  of
imported  and  local  capital  goods  in  India  makes  industrial  investments  40%  more
expensive  than  they  would  be  if  they  had  access  to  capital  goods  at  incernational
prices  (this  caxation  impact  is only  27%  for  projerts  in electronics),  Other
distortions  and  taxations  captured  by factor  y: add  about  15  percentage  points
of extra-costs  (difference  between  yl and  y2)
18.  Secon, the  surcharge  on investment  costs  due  to  Laxation  of  capital  goods
would  reqiire  a compensatory  Effective  Rate  of Protection  of 30%  on average  to
allow  Indian  investment  projects  to  earn  returns  equal  to  those  they  could  earn
under a free-trade  regime.  The amount  of Compensatory  Effective  Protection
stemming  from  capital  goods  taxation  varies  between  exporters  (average  of 25%)
and  non-exporters  (average  o' 35%),  and  between  projects  in  electronics  (15%)
and  other  sectors  (34%). Other  source;  of  distortion  and  taxation  on investment
costs  would  require  on  average  an  additional  12  percentage  points  of  compensatory
effective  protection  (only  7 percentage  points  in  Electronics).
19.  Thirdl, a  large  majority  of  non-exporters  (65%)  have  actual  EPR  in  excess
of the CEPR (sea last column  of Table above),  as opposed  to a niinority  of
exporters  (marginal  or significant  exporters). Potential  exporters  all iiAve
their  EPR  much  below  their  CEPR. Import  substitution  is  clearly  favored  by the
structure  of Effective  Protection.
20.  The  substantial  differences  between  Electronics  and  other  subsectors  with
respect  to duties  on imported  equipment  and the resulting  CEPRs  suggest  that
Effective  Protection  varies  markedly  from  one  subsector  to  the  other. The  data
presented  in  the  previous  Table,  after  reclassification  by  subsector  (as  opposed
to export  category),  indicate  indeed  significant  variations  between  subsectors
in CEPRs  and in the discrepancies  between  CEPRs  and  actual  EPRs (see  Table  4
below). Average  CEPRs  (adequately  weighted  by  Value  Added  in  world  prices)  range
between  about  15%  for  Electronics  to 30-45%  in  most  other  subsectors  and  up to
45-55%  in  Synthetic  Yarns. Furthermore,  the  comparison  between  CEPRs  and  actual
EPRs  indicates  wide  variations  in  discrepancies  and  uniequal  incentives  from  one
subsector  to the other,  though  the CEPR/EPR  discrepancy  on average  over all
subsectors  is small  (and  within  an acceptable  error  margin  of ± 10%).  2/  The
only subsector  where the actual EPR falls  within the CEPR range is Heavy
Chemicals.  Excess  of  actual  E?R  over  CEPR  are  negligible  (10-13%)  in  Basic  Steel
E/  This is not due to a concentration  electronics  projects in the
exporters:  electronics  projects  represent  21%  of  exporters,  versus  15%  in
non-exporters.
2/  It should  be emphasized  here again that project  EPRs are most likely
underestimated  by significant  amounts  compared  to the  real  EPRS  which  the
projects  will receive  when operating  (cf.  para.  5).  The  overall  average
CEPR/EPR  discrepancy  may thus  be larger  than  indicated  by these  results.
To illustrate  this  point,  footnotes  of Annex  I indicate  two  projects  for
which  output  prices  were  projected  to  be  10%  below  market  prices  (probably
for  marketing  reasons).  Once  firmly  established,  these  projects  will  most
probably  align  their  prices  to the  market,  and  their  EPR  will increase  by
40%8.9.
Ptoducts,  significant  and relatively  modest  in Synthetic  Yarns (17-26%),  and
qulte  large  (37-47%) in Miscellaneous  Lrdustries  (paper,  tyres,  plastlc-made
products).  Shortf-ll  of  EPR  relatlve  to  CEPRs  are  also  negllglble for
Electronics  (7-9%),  signLficant  ln  Food  industries  (22-35%),  qulte  large  ln  llght
chemicals  (34-48%),  and  very large  in  Engineering  industries  (45-60%). These
results  are  recapitulated  below:
Table  4:  Caep aatory ond  Actual  Effective  Protection  by SuCsctor  /I
LAU=e  Smotample  VAi  Factor  v  /  CEPR  (X)  /h  ActuaL  S Projects  (X)  in
Shero  eX  _lLa  Lm3  EPP MX  E^tls/Sihortfall
4eavy  Chemicals  17  20  1.40  1.53  28 45  37  60/40
Light  Chemicals  5  3  1.33-1.57  28-42  *6  0/100
Synthetic  Yarns  7  iS  1.56-1.66  "-53  70  50/S0
Basic  Steel  Products  12  7  1.49-1.60  37-50  60  57/43
Electronics  17  11  1.27-1.40  14-16  7  60/40
Other Engirering  26  25  1.43-1.61  34-49  -11  0/100
Food IndustriS  ;  6  1.41-1.50  30-43  a  50/50
"iscetten  o1us  9  13  1.43-1.52  30-40  77  80/20
OveraLl  100  100  1.40-1.55  31-39  30  42/SS
/  CEPRs  nd  Actual  EPQs  in  this  table  are  averges  weighted  bV  VAi.
ig  The lower  (resp.  higher)  value  of  the  indicated  rane  correspords  to  yl  (:esp.  y2).
Source:  Annex  V
21.  The ad-hocism  and inadequacy  of the structure  of Effective  Protection,
evidenced  by the large inter-sectoral  variations  in the discrepancy  between
actu  al and compensatory  EPRs, is further illustrated  by the intra-sectoral
discre?ancies  within  each subsector. Only in llrht  chemicals  and  engineering
Jidustries  subsectors,  all  the sample projects are  s'bject to  the same
discrepancy  (shortfall  of EPR),  as indicated  by the  iast  column  of  Table  4.  In
practically  each  o,ther  subsector,  the  projects  are  distributed  in  approximately
equal  shares  between  those  benefitting  from  excess  EPR  and  those  subject  to  EPR
shortfall.  The  level  of  Effective  Protection,  therefore,  is  markedly  uneven  not
only  between  subsectors  but  also  within  each  subsector,  and  provides  thus  very
heterogeneouis  incentives.  These  various  measures  and  indications  clearly  reflect
that fine-tuning  the structure  of prote^tion  via a multiplicity  of ad-hoc
protection  rates,  as  India  has  attempted  it,  is  counterproductive  and  practically
impossible.
Impact  of InRuts  and  Investment  .osts  on  ComRetLtiveness  and  Nominal  irotection
22.  India's  proLection  regime  and  tariffs  impact  on the  production  costs  and
competitiveness  of industry  in  various  ways.  There  are two  mechanisms  with a
direct  impact.  Firstly,  the capital  goods  taxations  affects  Value  Added,  as
analyzed  in the  previous  section.  Secondly,  the  higher  prlces  of industritl
intermediates  and inputs  are generally  passed  on into  the final  prlce  of the
output. The respective  impact  of these  two  factors  on the  prodtuction  cost  and
the  price  of the  output  depends  essentially  on the  Value  Added  content  of the
projects. It is  shown  (Annex  III)  that,  again  in  order  to  maintain  a return  on
financial  investment  similar  to the  return  available  under  a free-trade  regime,
the  project  output  requires  a Compensatory  Nominal  Protection  Rate (CNPR)  at
least  equal  to:10
CNPR  - a.CEPR  +  (l-a).NPRi
where.  - a is  the.  Value  Added  to  Output  ratio  (in  international  prices);
- CEPR  is  the  Compensatory  Effective  Protection  Rate  defined  earlier;
and
- NPRi is  the  average  Nominal  Protection  Rate  of inputs.
The first  term a.CFPR  measures  the impact  of investment  costs  on the output
production  cost,  and the  second  term (l-a).N?Ri  measures  the  impact  of input
costs.
23.  This  anal-sis  applied  to the sample  projects  indicates  that  most  of  the
additional  production  costs,  and  thus  most  of  the  Compensatory  Nominal  Protection
(CNPR)  required  for  output,  stems  from  the  second  term  capturing  the  impact  of
input  costs,  as indicated  below.
Table  5:  Ipct  of  Investment md Irpjt  Costs on Nominal Protection
(in  X of  Output Value at  International  Price)
Export  Input  Cost  VA/CEPR  /1  P-R  /a  Actual  U  Projects  (%) in
Catecory  Incect  lct  "Pt  ExcessShortfa  t
None  39.5  9.6-13.3  49.1-52.8  55.6  65/35
Potential  14.9  27.5-28.5  42.4-43.4  0  0/100
Marginal  32.7  6.2-10.5  38.9-43.2  43.3  33/67
Significant  22.9  10.8-17.3  33.7-40.2  21.9  23/77
Overall  31.7  11.7-16.1  43.4-47.8  .1  42/58
/a  - The  Lower (resp.  hijfer)  vaLue of  the  indicated  rwge  corresponds  to  yl  (resp.  y2).
Source:  Arnex  VI.
24.  A  broad  conclusion  emerges  clearly  from  the  above  table.  Input  extra
costs  increase production costs on average by  about 32% of  the  output
international  price.  This impact  cost impact  is only 15% in the category  of
Potential  exporters,  due to their  access  to relatively  cheap resource-based
inputs  (cf.  para.  10)  and to their  high VA content  (cf.  para.  9).  Surcharges
on investment  costs increase  production  costs  on average  by 12 to 16%.  This
investment  cost impact  is significantly  lower  (6-10%)  for  Marginal  exporters,
due to their  low  VA content  (25%,  as against  37%  for  other  categories)  and the
lower  tariffs  paid  for  their  imported  capital  goods  (57%,  compared  to  72% for
other  categories  - cf.  Table  3). The investment  cost impact  is  markedly  higher
for  Potential  exporters,  for  symmetrical  reasons  (high  VA content,  and  highest
tariffs  of  76% on  imported  capital  goods).  The  overall  impact  is  that  all  these
industrial  projects  would  normally  require  on  average  a  Compensatory  Nominal
Protection  (CNPR) of  43  to  48%,  say  about  45%,  two-thirds  of  which  to  offset  the
impact  of  high  input  costs.  It  should  be  noted  that,  due  to  the  partial  tariff
exemptions  enjoyed  by  Significant  exporters  for  their  imported  inputs  and
equipment  (cf.  Tables 2 and 3) as per the trade  regime  for  exporters,  such
projects  would require  a slightly  lower  CNPR (ranging  around  37%) for their
output.  It further  confirms  the findings  and recommendations  of the Export
Strategy  Report  (6663-IN)  regarding  the  critical  importance  of  providing  accesr
to  production  factors  at  competitive  prices  for  a  successful  export  policy.. 11 -
25.  As indicated  by the last column of Table 5, two-thirds of non-exporters
received  actual  nominal  protection  (NPR)  in  excess  of  the  CNPR. This  contrasts
sharply  with the  exporters  (marginal  and  significant),  where  a majority  (two-
thirds  to  three-fourth%)  receive  nominal  protection  below  CNPR,  and  particularly
with  Potential  exporters  which  all  receive  actual  NPR  well  below  the  CNPR  which
they  would  require.  'his  pattern  highlights  the  marked  bias  of the  protection
structure  in  favor  import-substitution  and  against  exports,  as  already  noted  in
para.  19.
26.  Overall,  the  discrepancy  between  actual  and  compensatory  Nominal  Protection
is small,  and  within  an  acceptable  error  margin  of  ± 10  percentage  points.  IV
However,  as noted  earlier  in the  case  of eff3ctive  protection,  there  are  wide
variations  in the  CNPR/NPR  discrepancies  from  one  subsector  to the  other. To
this effect, the  following Table indicates the  subsectoral  averages of
compensatory  and actual  nominal  protection  rates  (weighted  by Output  value  in
world  prices):
Tcbtsg  6: Connsoatory  and Actual  Nominal  Protection  by  Subsector  /I
(in  S  of  Output Value  at  InternatioaL  prices)
Subsector  Output tu)  Irsut  Cost  VA/CEPR  /b  CP  /I2  Actual  I  Projects  (X)  in
Share  IS  Inct  Imact  jPP*  Excesahortall
Heavy  Chemicats  17  46.4  10.0-16.0  56.4-62.4  58.8  60/40
Light  Chemicals  2  19.2  14.4-21.8  33.6-41.0  15.5  0/100
Synthetic  Yarns  12  46.0  17.0-20.5  63.0-66.5  64.9  50/50
Basic  Steel  Products  10  49.7  10.4  60.1  61.8  S7/43
Electronics  15  32.4  3.3  29.1-  35.7  34.2  60/40
Other Enginoering  19  24.1  12.0-16.6  36.1-40.7  19.2  0/100
Food Industries  6  23.6  0-13.1  23.5-36.7  25.8  50/S0
Miscellaneous  19  31.1  6.1-6.7  37.2-37.8  46.2  80/20
OveraLl.  100  35.7  4.8-8.5  40.5-44.2  43.7  42/58
/Ia  - The two  components  of  CNPRs  and  Actuat  NPRs  in  this  tabte  are  verage" weighted by Outnut in  worid prices.
/b  The  lower (resp.  higher)  vatue  of  the  range  corresponds  to  yl  (resp.  y2).
Source:  Annex VII
27.  The concordance  between  actual  and  compensatory  NPRs is higher  than  for
eftective  protection. The actual  NPR falls  within  the CNPR range for  Heavy
Chemicals, Synthetic Yarns, Basic  steel products, Electronics  and  Food
industries.  Excess of  NPR  over CNPR is negligible (about 9%)  in the
Miscellaneous  industries  (  dominated  in  the  sample  by  Tyres). On  the  other  hand,
the  shortfalls  of  NPR  relative  to  CNPR  are  significant  in  engineering  industries
(17-22%) and  in Light  Chemicals (18-25%).  Finally, the  intra-sectoral
discrepancies  observed  within  each  subsector  for  effective  protection  (cf.  para.
21)  are  equally  applicable  to  the  nominal  protection,  as summarized  in  the  last
column  of  the  table  above. Except  for  light  chemicals  and  engineering  industries
where  all  projects  are subject  to  an NPR  shortfall,  the  projects  in  each  other
subsector  are distributed  in approximately  equal shares  between excess and
shortfall  of nominal  protection  relative  to  the  CNPR.
IQ/  Again,  actual  NPRs  may  appear  reasonable  in  levels.  However,  they  are  most
likely  to  be  underestimates  of the  real  NPRs  which  the  projects  will  enjoy
when  operating.1.2  -
28.  On a product-wise  basis, it is important  to remark that subsectors
producing  intermediates and  inputs  for other  subsectors  (heavy chemicals,
synthetic  yarns,  basic  steel  products)  show  quite  higher  NPRs  and  CNPRs
(averaging  about 62%) than the  other subsectors  producing final  goods  which  have
NPRs and  CNPRs averaging  about 32g.  The only  subsector  where each  project's  NPR
and CNPR are concordant is the Subsector 45 of Synthetic Textiles.  In other
Chemical industries  subsectors (60,  61,63,65,67,68),  actual  protection tends to
be higher than required by 10 to 20  percencage points (e.g.,  synthetic  rubbers,
ABS,  Phenols),  except  for  inorganic chemicals  (e.g., nitric  acid, with  a
shortfall  of about  50 percentage  points),  pesticides  and the export-oriented
prcjects.  jj/  In  metal-based  and  engineering  industries,  the  picture  is  mixed.
A number  of projects  have adequate  nominal  protection  in the  domestic  market
(automotive  electrical  components,  steel  sheets,  consumer  durables,  EPA.BXs  and
jelly-filled  cables),  an  equivalent  number  have  actual  protection  markedly  below
their  CNPRs  (e.g.,  bearings,  aluminum  products,  machine-tools,  hand tools,  XLPE
cables,  steel  pipes,  carburetors,  and  auto  bodies  for  export),  and a few  have
excessive  protection  (e.g.,  CR  coils,  forgings).  In  electronic  industries,  most
projects  have adequate  protection,  some  have  excessive  protection  (e.g.,  PCBs,
tuners,  TV components),  and  professional  computers/software  have an NPR  below
NCPR by  about  20  percentage  points. Regarding  product-wise  effective  protection,
EPRs are close to CEPRs in Svnthetic textiles (subsector  45) and a number of
electronics goods,  higher in  synthetic  rubbers,  phenols,  forgings,  tyres,  plastic
made  products,  PCBs  and TV  components, and markedly  lower  in most  export-
oriented  projects,  pesticides,  consumer  durables,  machine-tools,  hand  tools,  XLPE
cables, bearings, professional computers/software, and carburetor.X.
29.  It should be noted that the average  actual and compensatory NPRs of about
45% are substantially lower than the average tariff collection rates of 60-70%
for 1987'88,  which in turn are much lower  than the  average  official  customs
tariffs  cf 130-140%. This  strongly  suggests  that  the  customs  tariffs  and  tariff
collection rates are fixed  by the  Government at  levels  often  exceeding  what would
be  required  by  protection  purposes  exclusively,  and  contain  a  substantial  amount
of "water"  for the  purpose  of generating  public  revenue.  The  benefits  eventually
derived from such public revenue are more than  offset by the  adverse effects of
this non-protection  objective  on the structure  and levels  of manufacturing
production  costs,  and have largely  contributed  to building-up  the Thigh-cost
economvy  which  India  and its  consumers  have to live  with.
Ul  The wide variations  and upwards bias of the NPR/CNPR  discrepancy  in
Chemical  industries  provide  a good  illustration  of the  cumulative  effects
of  protection  variability  and  distortions.  The  formula  of  para  22  defining
the  CNPR indicates  that,  if nominal  protection  was  homogeneous  and  NPRi
similar  to CEPR, the  compensatory  nominal  protection  would  not increase
when  a  product  is  consumed  as input  for  further  processing  in  a  downstream
industry. However,  manv chemical  'ntermediates  have nominal  protection
significantly  higher than required,  and thus jack up the CNPR of the
downstream  products.  Synthetic  textiles,  which have a moderate  CEPR
component  in the 10-20%  range (cf.  Annex  VII),  ultimately  require  CNPRs
of 60-70% due to the  cumulative build-up of protection caused by the large
variations  in  the  CNPRs  of  the  chemical  intermediates  required  successively
for theiL production.- 13 -
30.  Remark  - The substantial discrepancies between actual and compensatory
protections (both  nominal  and  effective)  are reflected  by  the  differences  between
the financial  and economic rates  of return  of the projects.  Some three-fourths
of projects have financial rates  of return lower than ERRs.  The sign identity
of MRR-ERR and EPR-CEPR according to the CEPR model (cf.  para. 13) is verified
in 84% of the cases, which confirms the relevance of the CEPR model to the
analysis  (the sign  equivalence  is statistically significant).  The  actual
relationships between MRR-ERR and EPR-CEPR, and between M?RR-ERR  and NPR-CNPR,
are displayed  on Graphs 1 and 2 respectively,  where most observations  are in the
lower left quadrant  These graphs suggest in both cases a linear correlation.
31.  The projects' financial rates of return are generally lower (often much
lower) than their EPRs,  by 15%  on average. The MRR-ERR  differences  by subsector
and export category are structured according to the  pattern below:
Tabte 7: Difference  Between  Financial  and Economic  Rates of  Return
(MRR-ERR,  sinpIe averages  in  M)
Export Cate.orv  VeM  Marginat  Si2nifcant  Potentit  t
Subsector
Heavy ChwmicaLs  *6.7  W.A.  -8.3  25.0  -1.0
Basic Steel  Products  -11.7  +16.0  W.A.  N.A.  -7.7
Synthetic  Yarns  -2.3  N.A.  -30.0  N.A.  -9.3
Light  Chemicals  N.A.  -5.0  -34.5  N.A.  -24.7
Electronics  -1.0  -15.5  -46.5  N.A.  -14.3
Food Industries  -20.0  W.A.  -17.0  -26.0  -22.3
Other Engineering  -11.5  -49.0  -32.0  -41.4  -27.8
Atl  -4.9  -13.8  -27.1  -35.5  -15.3
This pattern highlights the bias against  exports and against final  products, as
the MRR-ERR  differences  are  increasingly negative when moving  to the right
(increasing  export  potential)  or  downwards  (from  intermediates  to  final
products).  Some import-substitution heavy industries producing intermediates
(e.g.,  heavy chemicals) may earn extra  profits and rents.  However, the export-
oriented  industries  producing  final  goods  (e.g., food  industries, general
engineering) which have MRRs markedly  below ERRs  will generate lower  profits and
cash  than  their foreign competitors  (often operating under a  free-trade or
similar regime yielding a  return close to the ERR) and will be heavily
handicapped  over the long  term in their  capability  to modernize,  innovate  and
keep  abreast  in the  global  competition.
Towards  Lower  Protection  and  Tariffs
32.  The  simulation  of 'tax-free"  production  costs  (cf.  para.  11)  has  shown  that
many  more  projects  could  export  with  a positive  profit  margin  on international
prices  under  favorable  conditions  for  input  and  capital  goods  prices.  The  Indian
economic  authorities  would  strongly  object  to  a  tax-free  access  to  intermediates
and inputs (IIs),  primarily  on the grounds that the IIs domestic  industry
(generally  capital-intensive)  still  needs  protection  to  compensate  for  its  sunk
capital  costs. Indeed,  lower  protection  and  prices  for  inputs  and  intermediates
would  enhance  the  profitability  and  exportability  of  final  goods  industries,  but
at the  same  time  would  endanger  the  viability  of the  industries  producing  these- 14 -
inputs  and  intermediates.  One  question  then  is  whether  there  is  a 'balancing"
lower protection  level for  intermediates/inputs  which would maintain the
viability  and  profitability  of IIs  industries  operating  with  the  same  protection
and  price  ratio  for  their  own  inputs.
33.  A  second simulation  on the sample's  projects indicates  that such a
"balancing"  level  of  protection  (NPR)  for  Ils  would  be  about  40-45%. Under  this
second  simulation, the  tariffs on imported  capital goods  were reduced to  25% (as
per  the  recommendations  of  other  studies  12,/),  all  projects  producing  IIs  (heavy
chemicals,  synthetic  yarns,  basic  steel  products)  were  grouped  into  one  category
and  assumed  to  operate  with  average  input  NPCs  equivalent  to  the  weighted  average
of their  Output  NPC, and their  Output  prices  were computed  such as to keep
unchanged  their  profitability  rates.  1.3/ This iterative  simulation  produced
for Intermediates  and inputs  a "balancing'  average  NPR  of 40-45%  (45%  for  the
first  profitability  assumpcion,  40%  for  the  second  one - cf.  footnote  13).
34.  The  effects  of the  resulting  tariffs  (25%  for  capital  goods,  40%  for  all
IIs)  on the  international  competitiveness  and  profitability  of the  projects  are
summarized  as follows:
D~/  Bank working  papers,  prepared  for the  Report  7895-IN:  India  - Capital
Goods  Sector  Update,  August  2, 1989,  recommended  that  all  QRs  on capital
goods  imports  be removed,  tariffs  actually  levied  on capital  goods  be  cut
initially  to 50%  and  reduced  progressively  over 3-5  years  down to 25%,  a
level  compatible with  the  viability of  the  sick/fragile domestic
enterprises  producing  capital  goods provided  that they undertake  some
restructuring  and  labor  retrenchment.
iJ/ This  favorable  assumption  was  expressed  in  two  forms,  by  keeping  Constant:
- first,  the gross  profit  to output  value rate (which  implies  higher
output  prices  and  NPCs);
- second,  the  gross  profit  to assets  return.- 15  -
!aLbtL:  Effects  of Proposed  Tariff  Chane  on CQVetitiv noss
ad  Profitability,  by Product  Group  /,j
Profitabititv  (X)  of
SSnAtd Output  NPC  Damestic  Int*rnational  Price
Product  GrotYY  Reduction  Price  Futl  Cost  Moral  Cost  CNPR  CEPR
(X)  (X)  (X)  (X)  (X)
BY Export  Category
None  1.25  226  10  -25  0  33  15
Potential  0.91  .9  11  16  40  28  17
warginel  1.40  4  9  -23  2  34  9
Significant  1.33  -11  16  *10  16  24  7
SB  Subsector
Heavy  Chemicals  1.51  -31  t5  -25  7  30  12
Synthetic  Yarns  1.22  -44  13  -14  14  32  20
Uasic  Steel  Goods  1.  3  25  a  -26  -3  3  a  t
Average  Interwedtes  1.40  -33  13  -23  7  32  15
Light  Chesicals  1.13  -9  19  1  23  23  7
Electronics  1.22  -10  11  -18  3  29  2
Food  Industries  1.06  -4  21  -20  13  29  5
Other  Engineering  1  07  t2  6  1  L  3  A
Average  Final  Goods  1.20  -8  11  -12  11  28  11
Overa  Average  1.27  -15  12  15  10  30  13
/I  In this  table,  NPRs  are  weighted  by  Output  in  world  prices, nd  CEPUs by VA in  world  prices.
Source:  A-wxeex  VilI  and IX.
Under  the  proposed  tariffs  for  inputs  and  capital  goods,  the  competitiveness  and
profitability  of  the projects relative to  international  prices would be
significantly  enhanced. The output  prices  yielding  unchanged  profit  margins
would  decrease  on  average  by 15%  (-33%  in  IIs  industries),  and  the  average  price
competitiveness  (measured  by  output  NPCs)  would  increase  by a  similar  amount  (44
percentage  points in synthetic  yarns).  Price competitiveness  would greatly
increase  in final  goods  industries  where  prices  would  be  only  20%  above  current
international  prices  on  average  (7%  in  general  engineering  industries).  Though
only  one-fourth  of  all  projects  would  earn  a positive  profit  from  international
prices  on their  full  production  cost (as  compared  to  one-fifth  originally),  the
proportion  of projects  which would have a positive  profitability  on their
marzinal  cost  would  reach  60%,  implying  that  some  7%  of  the  projects  would  switch
from a negative  to a positive  marginal  profitability  and thus would  have an
incentive  to begin  exporting  a marginal  share  of their  production. Moreover,
output  NPRs  would  come  closer  to  CNPRs,  and  the  incentives  provided  by the  actual
and  compensatory  effective  protection  would  not  only  be  more  homogeneous  between
export-orientation  categories  and between  subsectors  but also induce  higher
efficiency  (the  average  CEPR  would  drop from  about  35%  to 13%).  Finally,  the
enhanced  profitability  of international  prices for Indian industries  would
reduce,  or even  abolish,  the  need  for  CCS  and  other  cash incentives  for  exports
made  by industries  with  a competitive  advantage.
Conclusions  and  Suatestions  (Summary)
35.  The  selected  sample  of  some  60  DFI  industrial  projects  financed  in  1988  and
1989 is  not  representative  tf India's  diversified  industrial  sector. However,
due to  the  sample's  focus  on  engineering  industries  and  on  chemical  and  related
industries,  it is reasonably  representative  of these  two  subsectors  which  have
received  a  major  part  of the  investments  and  incentives  for  development  in  India- 16
over the last decade.  Moreover,  because it is based on project  appraisal
reports,  the  analysis  provides  a credible  picture  of the  incentives  offered  by
the  protection  structure  as they  are  perceived  ex-ante  by  the  Indian  industry.
36.  A  number  of conclusions  regarding  nominal  protection  emerge  clearly  from
the analysis.  First,  the actual  nominal  protection  rate (NPR),  as measured
throughout  the analysis  by  the relative  domestic  to international  prices,
averages  40-45%,  which  prima  facie  would  appear  relatively  moderate.
Second.  the  actual  nominal  protection  varies  widely  between  subsectors,  from  15-
25%  for  industries  producing  final  goods  (light  chemicals,  engineering  and  food
industries)  to 60-65%  for industries  producing  essentially  intermediates  and
inputs for downstream industries  (heavy chemicals,  basic steel products,
synthetic  yarns). The  variability  of  nominal  protection  is  also  high  within  each
subsector, from product to product.  These inter- and  intra-subsectoral
variabilities  reflect  the  multiplicity  of ad-hoc  protection  rates  administered
by India's  economic  authorities.
Thirdly,  this multiplicity  of administered  protection  rates stems from the
attempts  to  fine-tune  the  structure  of  nominal  protection  to  the  levels  required
to compensate  for the prices  of inputs  and capitai  production  factors.  The
Compensatory  Nominal Protection  Rate (CNPR)  is on  avrage quite close and
comparable  to the actual  nominal  protection  of 40-45%.  However,  there are
substantial  variations  in  the  NPRs  and  the  discrepancies  between  NPRs  and  CNPRs
from  one  subsector  to the  other  and  within  each  subsector. In light  chemicals
and engineering  industries,  all.  NPRs are substantially  lower (by about 20
percentage  points)  than the levels  indicated  by CNPRs.  In each of all  other
subsectors,  the  products/projects  are  distributed  in  approximately  equal  shares
between  excess  and  shortfall  of  nominal  protection  relative  to  the  CNPR  levels.
This 50/50  distribution  could  be construed  as the  result  of an uncontrolled,
rather  than  a mastered  process.
Fourthly,  the extra-costs  paid for inputs (which  are on average 50% above
international  prices) account for some two-thirds  to three-fourths  of the
required  CNPR,  and  constitute  the  major  source  of output  price  distortions  and
uncompetitiveness.  Relatedly,  intermediates  (basic  steel  and  chemical  products,
synthetic  yarns)  show  the  highest  NPRs  and  CNPRs  (about  60%).
Fifth,  the  actual  and  compensatory  NPRs  of  aoout  45%  are  substantially  lower  than
the  average  tariff  collection  rates  (60-70%)  and  much lower  than the  official
customs  tariffs  (120-140%).  This  amount  of "water'  in the  tariffs,  introduced
for generating  public revenue,  is particularly  high for capital goods  whose
imports  pay tariffs  averaging  80% (with  a notable  exception  for electronic
industries  machinery,  which pay  about 40%).  The resulting structure of
protection:  highest for  capital  goods,  high for intermediates,  and lower  for
final  goods,  is  the invert  of the  generally  observed  one.
37.  Levying  for  public  revenue  purpose  the  highest  duties  on imported  capital
goods has been a  cardinal  error, in view of its pervasive  and long-lasting
effects  on industrial  production  costs  and  prices. Eirst,  the  investment  costs17 -
for  industrial  projects  in  India  are  generally  40%  to  50%  LiV  more  expensive  than
what they  would  be  with access  to  capital  goods  at international  prices. Such
additional  investment  costs,  by increasing  in the  Value  Added  the  renumeration
normally  required  by the  capital  (interest,  depreciation,  and  return  on  assets),
would  jack  up the  production  costs  by 10  to 15%  of output  international  prices
and do account  for  one-fourth  to one-third  of the  required  CNPRs  (this  impact
of  extra-investment  costs  on  production  costs  is  more  pronounced,  15-20%,  in  some
final  goods  industries  such  as light  chemicals  and  engineering  industries  and
in synthetic  yarns  due to  their  higher  Value  Added  content).
Second, the additional  costs of capital  goods  would require  a substantial
Compensatory  Effective  Protection  Rate (CEPR)  of 30%  on average  (from  15%  in
electronic  industries  to 45% in synthetic  yarns)  to allow  industrial  projects
to  earn  returns  at  least  equivalent  to  those  available  under  a  free-trade  regime.
Taxation  and  surcharges  on other  investment  costs  (e.g.,  cement,  buildings  ...)
would  require  an additional  10  percentage  points  of CEPR  on  average.
Thirdly,  though  the  actual  Effective  Protection  (EPR)  of  30%  is  close  to  the  CEPR
on average,  there  are  wide  variations  in the  EPRs  and  the  discrepancies  between
EPRs  and  CEPRs  from  one  subsector  to the  other  and  within  each  subsector. The
failure of economic authorities  to fine-tune  the  structure  of  effective
protection (and incentives)  to the levels  required  to compensate  for the
distortions  introduced  by their  pricing  policies  for  capital  goods  is greater
than  for  nominal  protection  fine-tuning.  Actual  EPR  varies  from -10%  to  8% in
final goods  industries (engineering,  light chemicals, electronics, food
industries)  to high 60-75%  in industries  producing  essentially  intermediates
(basic  steel products, tyres,  synthetic  yarns).  Furthermore,  the EPR-CEPR
discrepancies  range  from  minus  35-60%  in  final  goods  industries  (light  chemicals,
engineering  where  all  EPRs  are  substantially  below  CEPRs)  to  o1us  20-40%  in  the
intermediate  industries. The distribution  of levels  of EPR-CEPR  discrepancy
among  projects/products  within  most subsectors  becomes  the  result  of a quasi-
random  process.
orth,  the distortions  in capital  goods  prices  are "magnified"  into larger
distortions  in  Effective  protection  and  incentives.  About  80%  of the  projects
have financial  rates  of return  lower (often  much lower)  than ERRs.  In this
process,  some industries  (those  producing  essentially  intermediates)  may earn
extra  profits  and  rents. More  undesirable,  though,  other  industries  (generally
those  producing  final  goods)  pay higher  financial  charges  and generate  lower
profits  and  cash than  their  foreign  competitors  (often  operating  under  a free-
trade  or similar  regime)  and  thus  are  heavily  handicapped  over  the  long-term  in
their capability to modernize, innovate  and keep abreast in the global
competition.
38.  The  structure  of  incentives  provided  by  EPRs  appears  somewhat  more  rational
with respect  to markets  and external  trade  orientation,  though  the levels  of
EPRs  and  EPR-CEPR  discrepancies  show  again  wide  variations  within  the  dominant
group  of import-substitution  projects  (two-thirds  of all projects)  and those
which intend  to export  a marginal  or substantial  share  of their  output  (one-
third  of all projects). Actually,  import-substitution  projects  comprise  two
iJ~  and  up  to  80%  more  expensive  in  imported  capital-intensive  projects  (e.g.,
POY,  XLPE  power  cables).- 18
contrasted subgroups: - a large majority (80%) of projects with no plans nor
potential  for  exports  which  have  uncompetitive  output  prices  (55% above
international  prices  on  average),  positive  profitability  on  domestic  prices  and
largely  negative  profitability  (-41%)  on  international  prices,  and  high  EPRs  (60%
on average) well above CEPRs by some 30 percentage points; and - an anomalous
small group of "potential" exporters (14%  of the whole sample)  which all  would
produce at internationally competitive  prices with good profitability (at  full
cost) on the domestic as well as international  prices and nevertheless do not
plan the export at all.  Strikingly, these potential exporters, which pay the
highest import duties on their imported capital goods and would thus require
higher CEPRs (45-50%), all thave  negative actual EPRs, averaging -27%.
39.  Projects  with export plans generally  have uncompetitive  output prices (40%
above international prices on average), a positive profitability on domestic
markets, a negative profitability (at full cost) an their export prices, and
relatively  lower  CEPRs  (25  to  40%)  due  to the  partial  exemptions  of tariffs  on
their imported  equipment. These pro,ects  comprise  also two  contrasted subsets:  -
a minority (30%) of marginal exporters (export share  below 15%) with high EPRs
(about 50% on average); and - significant  exporters (the  export share in output
range between 20 and 75%, averaging 45%) which receive on their  combined output
a low or negative EPR, averaging -16%,  which is in most cases well below CEPR
by some 37  percentage  points on average. Another  distinct feature  of  significant
exporters,  which  most likely  explains their  export  orientation  in  accordance  with
the findings of other analyses, is the positive profitability of export prices
over their marinal  production costs which ranges from -8% to 46% and averages
15.5%. The marginal  profitability  of export  prices  for  marginal  exporters  is
negative  or  low, averagirg  only 1%, and  is largely negative  for most non-
exporters (averaging -12%).  15/
40.  These features highlight a common underlying pattern, namely the marked
bias  of  the effective  protection  structure and  incentives in favor of  the
domestic market and import-substitution  and against  export-orientation.  1j/  The
incentive of  Effective protection decreases regularly and markedly with  the
export  orientation  and  potential:  +60%  for  non  exporters  with  no  export
potential; *50% for marginal exporters;  -16% for significant exporters and -
27% for the anomalous group of projects with the best export potential.  This
bias  is not offset  by  the marginal and  insufficient incentives offered  to
exporters for lower input prices (which average about 40% above world prices,
compared  to  about  50%  for  non-export  projects),  lower  duties  on  imported
equipment (60% versus 75% on average), and CCS marginal income which adds some
3% to the  export  revenuss  and  profitability  of significant  exporters.
41.  In  viev  of the  priority  and  urgency  for  India  to  reduce  its  external  trade
deficit  primarily  by  promoting  and  increasing  further  its  exports  of  manufactured
products,  rebalancing  the  structure  of incentives  and  effective  protection  in
favor of exports  would be an important  task.  This task  would be difficult,
j5/  Naturally, the potential ex?orters have not only positive full-cost
profitability  over international  prices but also large marginal-cost
profitability.
1_/  This  bias  revealed  by the  project  sample  may  be due  also  in  part  to  a  bias
of DFIs to finance  import-substitution  projects.19 -
possibly  impossible,  to  achieve  by trying  to fine-tune  the  structure  and  levels
of nominal  protection  for outputs  and inputs.  The main obstacles  are the
complexity  and quasi-random  effects of  the structure  of  tariffs,  actual
collection  rates  and exemptions,  as well as the  generally  loose  relationship
between the landed  prices (after  duties)  of imports  and the market-driven
domestic  prices  for  most  manufactured  products. Nevertheless,  the  task  should
be undertaken  promptly. A first  urgent  and  simple  measure  should  be to slash
down  the  tariffs  on imported  capital  goods,  and  further  liberalize  their  imports,
to levels  which  would  effectively  induce  the local  capital  goods  Industry  to
increase  efficiency,  modernize  its  product-mix  and  lower  its  prices.  A  moderate
uniform  tariff  of about 25% would  be advisable  for  capital  goods,  with full
exemption  for  projects  exporting  at  least  half  their  output  (cf.  Export  Strategy
report).  Some  interim  exceptional  higher  tariffs  could  be  maintained  for  capital
goods  specific  to  subsectors  and  product-groups  dominated  by  very  few  enterprises
in  monopolistic  or  oligopolistic  positions  giving  them  a  price-maker  role,  while
increased supply and  competition should be  promoted in  these product-
groups/subsectors  to the extent  permitted  by the relative  sizes  of MESs and
markets.
42.  Another  important,  because  most  effective,  measure  would  be to  eliminate
the  dominant  negative  effects  of  high  prices  of intermediates  and  other  inputs.
The simulated  elimination  of all surcharges  on inputs  (tariffs  on imported
inputs,  price  differentials  on  local  ones,  non-deductible  excise  taxes)  indicates
that,  even without  correcting  for the  effects  of high investment  costs,  most
projects  (including  the import-substitution  ones)  would  earn from  the  current
international  prices  a  positive  profit  margin  on their  marginal  as  well  as  full
production  costs. The  proportion  of  projects  with  such  a  positive  profit  margin
would  triple  from  20%  to  63%. Among  the  import-substituting  projects  which  have
no prospects  nor potential  for export  under the present trade regime,  this
proportion  would  increase  dramatically  from  0  to  50%  if  they  could  procure  their
inputs  at international  prices.
43.  The  tariffs  actually  collec id  on  imported  intermediates  and  inputs  should
be lowered  to such  levels  that  domestic  producers  are  progressively  put  under
competitive  pressure  and  adjust  their  prices  downwards.  Acting  upon  the  official
customs  tariffs  only  would  be largely  ineffective  in India's  system  of  multiple
regimes  and  exemptions.  Most exemptions  should  be eliminated,  and  all  special
import  regimes  unified,  so that official  tariffs  and actual  collection  rates
converge  to each  other  and  coincide  ultimately. Reduction  of tariffs  down to
current  collection  rates  should  then  take  place  (causing  little  or no loss  of
public  revenue),  in one  step  preferably. Further  reduction  of tariffs  should
then  begin  with focus  on major  intermediates  and inputs  (basic  steel  products.
heavy chemicals, synthetic yarns and their upstream components,  . . .)  down to
about  40%,  with a priority  on product-groups  dominated  by few  enterprises  in  a
price-maker  position. This  level  of  40%  protection  for  inputs  (coupled  with  25%
for  capital  goods)  was  shown  by simulation  to  maintain  the  existing  profit  rate
of intermediates/inputs  industries,  and  their  viability. This set  of  measures
would  realign  the  higher  NPRs  of intermediates  and  inputs  from  heavy  industries
(often  highly  concentrated)  down  to  the  lower  NPRs  of final  products  subsectors
where domestic  competition  is generally  more active and export-orientation
higher,  and  thus  contribute  to  the  desirable  greater  homogeneity  and  uniformity
of  the  protection  and  incentives  structure.  More  importantly,  it  would  make  the20 -
most  effectLve  contribution  in  reducing  the  causes  of  uncompetitiveness  of  Indian
oanufacturers,  enhancing  their  export  potential  and  profitability  as  underlined
in the previous paragraph,  and posslbly arousing  pervasively  withln the
industrial  fabric  the  enterprises  interest  for  marginal  or  significant  exports.
44.  Finally,  custom  tariffs  and  collection  rates  restructured  as  proposed  would
fulfill  more effectively  cheir  primary  purpose  of providLng  protection  and
incentive  signals,  and somewhat  disregard  their  secondary  function  of public
revenue  generation  which  in  India  has  become  predowinant  and  introduced  pervasive
substantial  distortlons  in  prices  and  incentivs. The  function  of  public  revenue
generation,  which ls currently  another critical  i3sue  in India,  should  be
fulfilled  by other  more  specific  and  adequate  instruments,  in  particular  dlrect
taxation  (income  tax)  and  non-tariff  indirect  taxation  (neutral  excise  taxes,
MODVAT,  and preferably  the  consumption  VAT).  How to shlft  this  function  from
customs  tarlffs  to  other  taxation  instruments  ls  the  subject  of  another  analysis.- 21  -
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50  .;  *37  47  ;J  -;I
;f^thatl:  sol!lt5)  !S  i~~~~.41 -20  53  --b5 
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hs  BoCltSt9i  58  0.7  -3  b  -20  16  23  29
A racgr  45.gb  :?  42 4.29  40.96  !b.4!  -12  9b  15.50  s3o1
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7!  1.42  "a  I  11.
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,A4bl67i  1.59  31  14  45  11
"AtS6;b?7  1.26  1  -20  14  '0.2
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RelationshiP  Between  the  Effective  Protection  Rate  (EPR)  and  the  Financial
and  Economic  Returns  for  an  Industrial  Project
1.  Consider  an  industrial  project  requiring  an investment  I,  consuming  and
producing  tradeables,  and  generating  annually  under  permanent  operating  conditions  a
financial  cash flow  equal  to:  CF - VAd - W,
where: VAd is  the  project's  Value  Added  in  the  domestic  prices  resulting  from  the
country's  protectior,  regime,  and
W is the  project's  anrual  labor  cost.
The  annual  return  on the investment  is  FR  - CF - 1,
I  N
where:  N is the  project's  life  (in  number  of  years).
Under  a  free-trade  regime,  this  project  would  require  an  investment  Ii  (net  of
tariffs,  taxes,  subsidies,  and  price  differences  between  local  and imported  capital
goods),  and  would  generate  a cash flow: CE - VAi - W,
where:  VAi is  the  project's  Value  Added  in international  prices.
The  annual  return  on investment  would  be ER  - CE - 1
utN
2.  Introducing  the following  notations:
y - I  (ratio  of investment  cost  in  domestic  to international  prices)
Ii
s  - W  (share  of Labor  in  VA under  free-trade  regime)
VAi
and  EPR  - VAd - VAi  (by  definition,  the  Effective  Protection  Rate),
VAi
simple  algebraic  manipulations  lead  to  the  following  relationship  between  FR and  ER:
FR  - 1 .(l  +  EPR)
ER  y  1-s
3.  Under  simplifying  assumptions  permitting  algebraic  manipulations,  the  above
relationship  leads  to  a second  relationship  between  the  project's  Internal  Rates  of
return  achieved  under  the  two  alternative  trade  regimes. The assumptions  are  those
of the  elementary  model  for  the  computation  of an internal  rate  of return: the
investment  is implemented  in  one  year,  and  reaches  in its  first  year  of operation
its  operating  capacity,  thus  generating  a constant  annual  cash  flow  during  the  N
years  of its  life. When the  annual  cash flow  to investment  ratio  R is relatively
small  (below  0.3,  which  is the  case  of  most industrial  projects),  it can  be shown
that  the  internal  rate  of return  IRR  is  well approximated  by the following  formula:- 26 -
IRR  - R - 1
N(1  +  N-l.R)
2
4.  Applying  twice  this  formula  to  the  project  considered  earlier  under  a
protection  regime  and  a free-trade  regime,  the  internal  rate  of return  under
protection  (equivalent  to the  Financial  Rate  of  Return,  noted  MRR)  and  the  internal
rate  of return  under  free-trade  (equivalent  under  standard  circumstances  to the
Economic  Rate  of  Return,  noted  ERR)  are  shown  to share  the  following  approximative
relationships
MRR - ERR - C .1  (1  + EPR) - 1]
y  1-s
where: C is  a constant  specific  to  the  project's  parameters  under  the free-trade
regime.  1/
Simple  algebra  shows  that  MRR-ERR  >  0 is  equivalent  to
EPR  >  y-1,  that  is  EPR  >  (1-s)(y-1)  - CEPR
1.s  <  <
5.  Remark: MRR is the  financial  Rate  of return  before  income  tax.  If the
project  under  protection  is subject  to  an income  tax  T. the  financial  rate  of return
after  tax  FRR  and  the  ERR  enjoy  a relationship  similar  to that  above  where  EPR  is
replaced  by  EPR-t (with  t-T/VAi).
6.  The  level  of Output  nominal  protection  required  to ensure  a level  of Effective
Protection  equal  at least  to  CEPR  is  derived  from  the  general  formula  of EPR:
EPR  - NPRi  +  NPRo  - NPRi.
a
where:  a is the  VA/Output  ratio  in international  prices.
Hence:  NPRi  +  NPRo  - NPRi  > CEPR  leads  to:
a  -
NPRo  > a.CEPR  +  (l-a)  NPRi  - CNPR
1/  Specifically,  C - R .[l  +  N-1  3,  where  R  - CE . VAi-W
2N(1  + N-1.R)2  Ii  Ii
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----------------  ------  ------  -----  ----- ~~~~~~~~  ...  ....  - - - - - -
bverage(veightW)X  3I. 03  50.53  59.67  9.15  20.47
Average(plaisl  192.41 74.17  1.41  1.55  S.9871 40.81  71.94  41  1  .t  I  !  4104
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Floppies  iOOZEOU)H90)  1.4  0  1.04  1.09  3  6  0  -6  -3
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Export  Subs.ctortProdect)  Duties( Factor  Factor  CEPRI CEPR2  Actual EPR  EPR  EcMs?Sjhort$dl
Status  -----------  ----  Vh  Do  lepr  YI  t2  -----  -----  - - .EPR-CEPR2EPR-CEPRl
------  (Crornl  kal6ood------  ------  -------  -------
Heavy  Chtsica1s:
ME  Phgnols(60/61)  0.91  .38  1.42  5  27  153  l2b  l.3
NE  Buta  Rubber(b7)  5.11  134  1.5  1.5  43  43  0  25  25
NE  EPN  Rubber(67)  6.01  136  1.4  1.44  32  35  121  96  99
NE  ABSI67)  .6b3  82  1.42  1,47  I1  13  3  b  73  75
NE  Alpha Olephins(67)  23.46  90  1.41  1.7b  37  b9  25  -44  -12
ME  SIR(67)  9.82  84  1.5  1.59  41  57  143  96  10-
CouldExport  Nitric  Acid(6O061)  2.42  91  1.53  1.62  46  54  -29  -92  -74
Exptr  PA(6I/671  20.67  0  1.04  1.16  15  -10  -25  -13
Ezptr  NAI61/67)  7.39  94  1.435  1.59  40  53  -32  -85  -72
Ezptr  RA(61167)  4.12  98  1.39  1.62  33  53  61  9  29
AVEiA6E  (weightedl  91.54  29.19  44.90  37.14  -7.76  8.95
Average  (plain)  99.89  1.40  1.53  31.10  41.90 59.70  16.80  27.60
9  10  1O  10  10  1O  10  10
Synthetic Textilei:
NE  PFY(45)  33.78  99  1.45  1.65  35  50  89  39  54
NE  PMYM45)  5.31  9O  1.79  1.31  69  71  90  19  21
NE  NTYV45)  20.41  94  1.66  1.66  58  58  53  -5  -5
Eaptr  Synthetic Yarn(451  4.45  1.33  1.53  23  37  -20  -57  -43
AVERA6E  lotighted)  63.95  44.33 53.39  70.01  16.62  25.68
Average  (plain)  87.67  1.56  1.66  46.25  54.00  53.00  -1.O0  6.75
3  4  4  4  4  4  4  4
Basic Steel  Products:
NE  Sprc.Steel  Castgsl73/74)  4.49  96  1.63  55  -26  -S1
NE  Forgingsll7/74)  2.7  J3  1.505  27  26  -11
NE  ColdRoll  Col1s(73/74)  4.25  1.55  48  174  126
NE  Steel TuJes(7 3!74)  3.14  96  1.65  56  70  14
NE  Iron Pipeil73/74)  5.3  110  1.51  1.71  44  61  -10  -71  -54
NE  Coated SteelShetts(73/74  6.25  90  1.44  1.59  34  46  93  47  57
nargin.Eipt  Forringsl73/74)  1.41  63  1.53  1.575  17  21  176  155  157
AVERAHE  le:ighted)  28.03  36.714  49.84  60.09  10.25  .0.57
Average  (plain)  78.83  1.49  1.60  32.33  46.29 71.86  25.57  54.00
S  3  7  3  7  7  7  3
Electronics:
NE  TV  Loudspeakers(9U  0.44  36  1.2  1.4  14  27  120  93  126
ME  Audio  Systegt  OB  1.33  42  1.42  1.51  32  39  45  6  13
ME  Sinqle-sided  PM f)  0.7  42  1.24  1.49  14  29  159  131  145
ME  Step  kotors(90)  2.07  47  1.33  1.38  22  25  31  6  9
NE  B1M  and  Color TVs(")  5.21  44  1.38  1.55  14  20  82  62  68
ME  Electronic Tuners(")  0.55  44  1.26  1.39  -3  -5  297  292  290
NE  EPABIs(B)  5.16  31  1.22  1.33  15  23  13  -10  -2
Nargin.Eipt Coeewter  Ternnals(90)  2.17  45  1.39  1.53  27  35  19  -16  -9
Nargin.Eipt  PCs(90)  12.97  39  1.23  12  6  -b
Exptr  Matnframs&Sof  tuare  9O)  19.59  3O  1.18  1.29  13  21  -35  -5b  -49
Ezptr  Floppipes(I  E0EO)(90)  1.4  0  1.04  1.09  3  b  0  -6  -3
__  --  - - - - --  - - - - - ...  ...  - --  - --.  ..  ----
AVERASE  leiqghted)  51.59  14.07  22.03  7.24  -14.37  -6.93
Averaqe  plain)  3.36  1.26  1.40  24.92 21.90  o*6.09  50.20  51.27
it  11  10  1I  10  it  to  11- 30  -
Food  Industrils:
ME  Soybean  0:1(36)  4.28  0  !.49  o  115  79
CouldEapOrt  6lucose(3i)  8.97  90  1.52  43  -i9  -61 CouldExport  SIucS(31)  10.03  Q3  !.:2  i.4;  9  45  -^h  -'1  -55
E.ptr  Vanil:in138)  0.8  1.5  I9  1;7 
AVERAGE  (tweiqhted(  4.12  .°.70  4.S7  7.o7  -39.57  -43.10 Averaoe  !l;ain)  91.00  !.41  1.5  . 0 41.3  52.0o  -. 72.
3  3  2  4
hIlscIIlaneous  Inoustr;es:
ME  Paoer 2)  2.99  86  !.58  46  75
margin.Exot Tvres(56)  44.03  38  1.415  !3  93  50
Exotr  BOPP  Fila(57)  1.56  89  1.49  1.59  33  39  79  40  46
ME  PVC  Tiles(17)  4.18  '1  1.5  "a  19  -19
NE  Plastic  ProfilesI57)  1.12  40  1.4  1.42  29  31  51  20  :2
AVERAGE  (weighted)  53.'7  32.90  39.72 76.81  9.13  49.20
AvIrrq  (plain)  '4.80  1.44  1.52  1.67  38.50  61.40  17.50  39.33
5  3  4  3  4  5  4  3
Light  Chuicals
Exptr  Pestlczdest63)  6.52  1.:9  1.5  31  39  -29  -68  -60
Exptr  Na  Aepic1lln(Druq)(61)  0.9  1.3  1.71  28  66  -13  -79  -41
4arqan.Expt Maqnetic  Ovides168)  4.88  59  1.3  1.5  25  42  25  -17  0
…  …  _  _  _  _  _  __
AVERA6E  Itweighted)  12.2  28.40  41.97  -6.35  -49.32  -34.75
Averige  (plain)  59.o0  :.33  1.57  .8.00  49.00  -5.67  -54.67  -33.67
I  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
Other  Engineering  Industries:
CouldExport  Aluminum  Extrusions(75)  5.23  37  1.6  52  -58  -110
CouldExport  Aluminum  Fo:l75)  .37  :1  !41.  1.58  34  46  -33  -79  -67
.ouldExport 8earingsi77)  11.2^  54  1.51  1.5I  49  49  -14  -63  -63
Exotr  Machine-Tools1l)  4.52  95  1.4  1.54  34  46  -21  -67  -55
Ex:tr  Power  Handtools(84)  9.42  cn  1.39  1.65  '1  be  -23  -. l  -54 C:uidExoort ILPE  Cdbles  es  10.86  e5  1.85  1.?  0o  -34  -114  -110
NE  'ellv  Filled  Cadblesi85)  7.29  86  1,4  !.5o  :4  45  15  -30  -i2
.E  Batteriesn86)  8.51  90  1.34  6o  -15  -31
NE  Fluoreso.  Lamps'8 7 $  10.74  s0  1.4!  1.6  42  5e6  27  -.°  -!5
"aroin.Exot  waliq  machlnesi87!  9.48  47  :.71  1.46  24  *5  -9  -44  -33
NE  Auto  Electrialst93)  3.06  02  1.52  1.55  39  41  34  -?  -5
zuldExport  Carburettors  °3)  7.84  68  1.4E  -. 1  2  46  -23  -69  -60
ExDtr  BuS  BodieS93)  7.2  1.43  36  -23  -59
NE  2-l  Shock towirbs(94)  1.83  61  1.:5  1.45  13  23  17  -6  4
AVERAGE  (weightsa  99.57  40.42  54.12  -12.49  -65.79  -49.99
Average iplain)  '5.08  :.45  I.b3  36.83 50.23  -11.43  -60.77  -44.08
13  12  13  12  13  14  13  12
OVERALL  AVERA6E(oeiqhtd)  414.77  23.14  45.02  30.23  -19.39  -2.87
CVERALL  AVERAME(plain)  70.53  1.40  1.55  30.08  41.78  40.51  -1.70  11.69
Samale  si:e  51  48  54  48  54  58  54  49- 31  -
1W"CT  U ItU9T  MS ItEMS7tOt  COStS  011  CUWIIITJYVIII  MS  3  e4
......  ....... _.  _..,  . ,_,,........  ..  ,  ,,,,,-  ..........  ...  ...  ...  ......  ......
Exwt  Pricht  am  I"et  Coot  VA  hted Fas  t  11`01  CftP.A  ActuAl  WIt  bPS  EiceeSlhorttall
Statue  . --  1pric)  leact  CEP£I  CEPR2  ------  .-----  ----------  - -t  4wo-c"I
...  . __  ,,  _  ,  ....  .......  ..  . ....... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--  --  - ..  ..
Icroret  -------------------------  mn  %  of  Outaut VAluN  at  Interntionil  Pril  - ------------------------------------
ttlon  f.ortert 
Soybean  0i11i36)  39.7  37  4  41  498
Pfy(41I  3.14  45  lb  3  n1  68  67  -'  &
PMMO4)  21.!4  50  lS  18  a  68  '4  3  3
NTY(41)  !9.4  S0  20  20  0  73  61  -:  '7
PaD  rt,l)  9.83  20  23  a
PVC  Tilens57l  9.01  40  le  5i6  '  -a
Plastic  Pvro  iee5})  5.06  33  6  7  S9  44  44  4  5
PFhrol  ei(016 1  5.'2  41  3  4  44  45  44  19  .0
la  Rvlubberti7)  13.t4  52  16  16  6e  8  77  9
EPf Rulitior  67)  21.4  i  34  9  10  43  64  i7  23  2t
A3S447)  3.7  51  3  4  54  55  77  22  S3
Alpha  0l1ehlogi171  60.07  66  14  2'  32  95  77  -is  .5
5WAY7)  46.04  52  3  11  40  iX  77  14  17
Spec.Stol  CUstgs(73!74)  14.27  57  17  75  49  -24
Feuqln1170/141  .6  43  15  s  54  -4
ClIdhil  Cotls(73/74)  25.4  43  4  51  72  21
Steel  tvb"  ('3/74)  1.94  22  22  44  49  5
Iroe Ftoest73174)  12.7  29  20  2S  49  57  25  -32  -24
Csatnt StelShots(M7374  61.33  59  4  5  63  6  to  4  5
Jolly  Filled  Caleos83  19.49  36  11  17  49  55  43  -12  -n
httoruusl6U  20.21  32  23  40  24  -34
Florenrc.  LMOtlU7)  19.25  11  23  31  14  42  24  -1  -8
EPMII  eI)  12.;1  1  7  10  21  24  20  -4  -1
TV  Loudspeakerst90)  1.ii  2  3  6  5  3  30  22  25
Audio  Systeeol90)  5.2  43  7  9  50  52  54  2  4
Sieqlt-tided  PC3S(  W  3.2  34  3  t  39  42  71  29  12
St"  Ibtotrsl9  5.4  45  8  9  53  54  56  2  3
8SW  too Color TVs9O)  58.32  60  2  2  62  62  6e  i  6
Electronic  Tunsrs(90)  3.98  54  -I  0  53  54  95  41  42
Auto  Electricalln  93S  7.'&  53  lb  17  t9  70  67  -3  -2
2-0 Shock  Aksorbewsu94)  5.15  25  5  3  30  33  31  -2  1
..  ....  ....  .........  ------. _.........  .....  ....  .
Averaqe(eeq4tt  )  4.62  9.08  14.49  4.23  61.35  6I.e1  0.2t  3.55
Averiqleplianl  645.83  39.52  9.41  .S.2t  50,?0  52.94  55.sa  2.74  ?,?t
Variance  253.02  45.1I  6S.b4  297.43  192.01  377.21  :85.55  :07.38
31  31  23  I1  23  :1  31  31  :
Utentlal  Export
Gl:coIetSS)  1  .23  11  23  34  2  -:
alucoeaei3)  19.67  6  15  24  21  ;0  a  -;8  -:°
Nitric  kAi(60/61)  3.46  34  12  o  i  2  14  -58  -52
Alauimua Extrusionsl75)  19.11  -3  14  ;1  -19  *;0
Al mnue  Foail  5)  9.6  14  :1  24  27  a  -1I  -li
8cirinqns77)  14  15  '  37  52  52  4  -43  -46
ILPE :ables(s51  .13.3  22  49  51  71  3  -4  -77  -'5
C4rbUirettoroi931  12.1  I  24  30  42  46  3  .45  *39
Averaqgeieqktod)  12.35  19.04  27.31  29.?0  39.72  -2.91  -42.43  -2  .67
Averaqt(plain)  111.32  14.33  27.50  23.50  44.0O  43.31  0.00  -'3.S8  -43.17
Variance  105.11  184.92  154.75  364.33  421.98  91.25  287.48  245.14
3  a  6  I  t  3  il  S  67- 32  -
larlil  mrwt
Tyrst(56)  231.1  32  47
fqfet  ItC Da  Itufi&1)  9.32  12  :2  25  ;4  25  -9  Forgin  173/74)  7.  7  52  '  '  5  Q  6  83 
IIIAngq  whinn/(p)  44.1  31  "  . -i
Co  uefitr Torainolet"¢)  35  5  '9  05n
Ps  (901  73.?7  IS  : 
..  ..  ..  _..  ....  _._...  ---  ----
AvKqgI.eq 6tMt)  "9.3  5, 1  ,  .5  4  ;  ,380
AvrVqItIldIn)  :90.4?  '  . "'  "s  :0.83  4.  0  1.3  i,  4  .
#arlnce  5 3§  1:,3!  4  :5  34  °:5!E:0:  :.
;ir  +ant  Exports
Verilin  f  5  5  3  a~  JQ  : 80P9  1si:  r,7  ,  i.8  :i  3  ;:  :4  ::  4:)
t;t,Xl  OF  o,  3.4  :5  :32  8  !  :a  -:
3.-2  :  :5  J?  *  4  .4
:tsla: Xn  o.  i  .o  !A  :o  a8  44  -I  -. 5  .-9
Wa  Aoi:lin  rruo, b5)  4.4  J  7?  !  :4  49  J4  -15  -3
qa4cM  e-  Ocil 31)  :,e;9  14  :06  3.1  3  -23  -2' Pawa unetools14:  1,7  !  40  5  56  3  -3  -
Aln'auwhs&Softu4reJj  ::.91  a  13  20  25  -B  -33  -2B F ooeies4100ZE0  Q;0  4.55  !  2  !  2  0  -2  -1
out  lodlet9l)  !Q.3  49  13  62  41-2
..-----  ----  ---  .....  ----.  ---  . ,........  .__
Avenrge  mept9let)  :33  Q..  14.43  33.64  32.43  16.21  -21.62  -l'.41 AvWaqgttg.all  187.55  22.92  10.77  17.7  33.62 37.27  21.2  -20.931  -11.69 v4arlnce  149.46  :3  103.65  186.24  217.11  566.38  332.99  376.*7
3  i3  11  1  I  11  is  11  13
0ver1I Averaqoe(plain)  1345.62  31.69  11.?3  16.13  44.00 47.  83  39.10  -9.00  -4.21 Ovirill  Averaq9(UlZght96 )  35.65  .94  12.06  40.80  40.38  43./  -6.62  -1.70- 33  -
I2CT  OF  IwUT  N  IM  yESTIT  COTS  a  COWtTIT  IYUul  i  Ofb 8y SUIDECYDtI
"li  VII
Elwt  DOWhtt  OUTPUT  lhet  Ct  VA  Ita:ct  froa  CUPRI  P1Q2  Actual *MP  MM  EzcnetShort
Status  .......  2laces lent  CEPPI  CEPR2  -. ---  NMIR-CIPR21  pp-CO'
. _...  _  ....  _  ,  ....  .....  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  ..  ..  . --  --
(crone) ---  --------------------  in 7 a4  Output  Value  at International  P'icn  -----------------------------------  .--
eiavy  Chticals:
NE  P"0mno2 1 s.j 4 1)  5.92  41  3  4  44  45  64  1  9
ME  luta  ulbtr(O7)  13.34  52  14  It  be  i8  7'  7
NE  EPI  Rubbrmt7  212.  34  9  10  43  44  7  23 
NE  A8S(67)  8.7  51  3  4  55
NE  Alhha  311#0hin167)  t0.07  48  14  27  82  5  77  -18
OE  SO3(672  46.04  52  a  it  O  77  14
COultE1pOrt  Nitric  kAiE(60/611  3.46  34  32  318  4  72  14  -50  -5:
Exptr  P141167  42.22  30  2  7  32  37  25  -12
EAPtv 94(61147)  24.84  i5  17  23  32  3S  0  .30  -
Egotr  NA6l42!47)  8.52  32  15  25  47  57  41  4  1'
.__  ......... .......... ....  ......... ... .........  ....  ......  .......  ------  .......  ......  ------  . ----  -....  ------
AVE5*I6E  (wehted)  227.1  44.315  0.0Q3  18.0P  54.38  62.42  58.30  -3.43  2.42
Average  plain)  40.90  1.90  12.50  52.60  57.40  53.90  -3.50  1.10
Sy1thetic  Tetilu10  10  10  10  10  10  10
tE  PF9145)  73.24  45  2i  23  42  43  47  -I  i
1}  909(45)  21.24  50  28  21  8  4  8t  74  *  9
NE  3TV(45)  59.4  so  20  20  70  70  a  -2  -2
Ezptr Synthetic  Rn45)  M2  2  27  8  12  34  39  20  19  -24
._-  --  - - --  - --  --  --  --  -----  ...............  ...  ------  ......  . --  --  ----.--  ..........  ..  ...  ................ 
AVERME  (nightdl)  144.73  44.03  17.07  20.44  63.02  i4.4  44.37  -1.41  1.85
Rverage  (plain)  43.00  25.50  18.25  53.25 41.25  57.75  -3.50 -0.50
4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4
heic  Stoll  Prothwts:
ME  Se  c.Stnl  Catqs173174( 14.27  57  17  75  4t  -24
ME  Forginps73/74)  4.4  43  2s5  53  4  -4
ME  Coln  oll  Coils731/74)  25.  4  43  a  51  72  21
ME  Stnel Tubti;71/74)  7.94  22  22  44  49  5
NE  Iron Ppelo  73/74)  12.7  29  20  28  49  57  25  -32  -24
NE  Coate  Statl  5liets(73/74  41.33  59  4  5  43  64  t4  4  5
Narqin.Efpt  Forginq9173/74)  7.73  52  4  4  5  56  33  27  27
..........  .........  . .. __...  ...... _  .. _.  . ..  .......  -----  ----  ----  ----  -----  ----  ...  ..  ..
AYVERAE  (oightsi  136.34  49.45  i.48  20.33  40.12 60.24  i2.82  12.9  2.  5
Average  (plain)  43.57  9.33  14.14  5t.00  57.84  57.14  -0.71  2.t7
7  3  7  3  7  7  7
Electron  cs:
NE  TV  Loudspeakers(0  1.88  2  3  t  5  8  20  22  25
ME  Audio  Systesse(90  5.i2  43  7  9  50  52  54  2  4
NE  SingIe-slde  PC1S(90(  3.2  34  3  t  39  42  ?1  29  32
ME  Stop  Notonl(901  5.4  *  U  9  53  54  54  2  3
fE  no and  Color TV(Si9  58.32  40  2  2  62  62  t8  4  t
NE  Electronic T?WWtr  v^  1  54  -2  0  53  54  95  41  42
NE  EPABIsfNU  12  21  14  7  10  21  24  20  -4  -I
Margin.Evot  Comouter  Torsiaalsl9l  3.55  51  - !  9  58  i0  54  -4  -2
Mr;in.Eopt  PCs(901  78.37  II  2  20  19  -2
EIptr  liaifrum4los tef  oe  f  32.92  12  i  1!  20  25  -9  -33  -28
Ezptr  Floopin(ME00EOU)  2)  4. 5  0  1  2  1  2  0  -2  -2
.-  .--  .-.-..  - .--  . . .--  . ...  ........  ......  ----  ------  ------  -----
AVERAGE  lwihted)  215.5  30.43  3.24  3.53  33.72 27.43  32.23  -2.25 -1.49
veraqe  (Iplain)  30.45  4.27  4.40  34.73  38.30  41.91  5.90  7.1.
11  22  20  11  10  11  20  22- 34  -
*tD  I  lul  39.7  37  413
fo3  Ev  lachi3f)  (7.23  II  :34  2  32
Ctulgawt  61csuui1gp  13.67  6  :I  0  -O  -2
Ettr  VaIIin  IA3)  3.15  23  28  20
_...........  .,,  _,,  .......  . . ...  . ----  ------  ------  ........  ----  ----  ----
AVEowE  tOltmsttep  73.75  23.60  14.28  3.:'  23.45  :o,  :53.80  -1-.48  -1.36
Avwtaq,  pllin)  20.50  250  17.00  :1  -20  T  -t SO
4  i  2 *~~~  ;  . ' 
ttlscollnunt  nto s  uson
If  po  r[52)  9.gO  6  13  :9  a
Wrqin.Eipt Tyres0b,  231.1  32  43  I8I  1
Ezotr  0P9  Fhmt57P  5.51  21  :  43  11  1
tE  PVC  Tiln7I  '.i  40  '°  -8  6
oE  Plastic  Profitsis57l  5.  06  Is  7  39  40  44  4  5
_........  ..................  ----  . .....  . ------  ...  . ...  ..........  ......  ......  . ......  .........  ...
Av1RP3  iwlebtqAte  21.41  31.10  t.07  12.0  37  14  37.20  4o.18  12.'  '.  3
Average  lpIleia  6.40  7.00 115  '  5.4  37  .00  42.00  3.5  't  )
5  3  4  3  4  5  4  3
L:qht Chusicals
Eaptr  Pnticid1§163)  9.e3  i  s  26  33  *4  -I  -45  .3
Ezptt  llt  Apic11lim(rtqol)(5)  4.4  37  3  12  42  49  24  -15  -3
atrwmn.Elpt  agnletic  OuaiduaO)  9.32  12  13  n2  2!  34  25  9  0
---  - -----  ----  ------  . ... -----  ----  . ...  ..  . .-......  ........ _._.
A  AERAE  atightoAl  546.37  19.11  14.43  21. 0  33.60  40.93  15.33  -25.15  -17.77
Avrwae  (pluin)  22.33  12.67  20.00  35.00  42.33  19.33  -23.00  -153.7
3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
Other  Ei4teegrino  Industr:in
CoullEaEprt  Almatwe Eatruseas(73)  19.16  -3  14  It  -19  -30
CoeidElsport  Alutnet  Foil  (75)  9.6  16  3  11  .4  27  3  -19  -lb
CovIdEaWeet  kisanqsl771  14.3  15  37  37  52  52  4  -U4  -4
Etptr  Nachime-TwIu(tll)  10.92  12  14  19  26  31  3  -73  -23
Ezptr  Pow HaadtoolsaS4)  10.06  17  lI  40  35  56  3  -53  -32
Coual8tpwrt ILPE Cibless(nl  16.3  22  49  5  1  71  73  4  -77  -75
ME  Jolly FiMIN Cablts 5)  29.9  33  11  17  49  55  43  -12  -'
tE  latteries(86)  20.21  32  23  00  26  -34
ME  Fluoresc.  LAuOsM)7)  19.25  it  23  31  34  42  26  -16  -8
larqin.Expt Ibrhi0m  MacIaznel7'  44.3  31  5  7  36  38  30  -3  -6
ME  Auto  fle-tricals1932  7.76  53  16  17  t9  70  o7  -3  -2
CouldEzport  CrbaurettorsIY3)  12.1  IS  24  30  42  48  3  -45  -39
Egptr  us 5odles(93)  19.3  49  13  *2  42  -21
NE  2-i Shock  Attorerusl94l  5.15  25  5  a  20  .3  31  -2  1
.............  ----  . ....  ---  ......  .......  ----  ----
AVERAGE  (weighted)  236.1  24.03  1.64  23.00  44.11  43.23  :9,1I  -2l914  -.2.%0
4  i9ie tpldin)  24.00  18.9  5  3.85  44."1'  '  35  1321  -28.a5  -22.02
14  12  17  !2  13  14  13  12
OVEFbLL  AVERMEhlveqhtd)  1568.44  30.f  11.49  4  155  42.45  43.34  33.5  -11.7  -'.13
0ERttLL  AVERABE(Plamin)  31.9  11.!3  1*.13  44.  0  47.33  39.10  -9.00  -4.:1
Sauiple  Si  53  48  54  48  54  58  54  48- 35  -
EFFECTS  OF  PlOD  TARIFF  CMNU9S  ON  CEPh,  Ctli CDIIETITIVENS3  AO PIOFITASILITY  Awl VIII
. ........  . .....................  ._  . . ... _  . _.._  . fi..................  . .................
NPR  Variation  due  tO
Export  Pyroduct  CDRI  I  CIPRIZI  orooeud  tariffs  on:  191(1)  Pro4itdbiIltv(% of sil%)  g4,
Status  -......  . ..  ..-  .....................  ......  ...  ..
Inout  VA  Total  Capital  Interodte  Both  DomeStic  International  Pricl
I pact lmpact  6oods Inputs  Frice  FiliCo,t  SarglCG,t
Ibon  Euporter
Soybean Oi36)  2  4  0  34
PFH4St)  17  22  8  29  -27  -37  -60  7  8  3  1q
POY(45)  31  30  3  39  .7  -20  -27  49  I  -48  -27
ITY145)  25  26  8  35  -11  -27  -3S  27  3  -17
Pipert02)  2  34  0  34
PVC  Tiles(57)  0  23  0  23
Plastic Pro4ilvsI57)  6  31  I  33  -2  -2  -4  40  5  -35  -8
PhsnotsbO/61  5  34  I  35  -3  -7  -10  54  12  -36  - I
bta  ubber  67)  16  2J  6  31  -9  -31  -40  37  5  -30  1
EPI  RublrI7)  15  29  4  33  -10  -5  -15  53  6  -43  -3
AIS(67)  3  21  1  29  -5  -10  -15  42  13  -42  -18
Alpha  Olephaas(f71  17  24  7  31  -a  -44  -53  24  5  -1  14
S11(47)  16  32  3  35  -9  -21  -30  47  I  -36  -4
Spc.St"e  Cast  p173)74)  13  27  4  31
Forpinqs1l3/74)  2  24  1  25
Coldlell  CoilsI731142  0  33  0  33
Steel  TuOts(73174)  21  24  S  33
Iron  Pip"s173/74)  21  22  It  ?I  38  -9  -17  9  12  5  22
Coated  SteelShts(73/74)  13  34  I  37  -3  -24  -26  42  2  -40  -26
Jelly  Filled  CablesI(5)  12  25  4  30  -6  -16  -22  21  14  -4  14
Iltterinih)  25  23  10  34
Floerc.  Lasps(17)  22  lo  12  29  -13  0  -23  13  11  -B  31
EPAnsINE  )  2  23  1  24  -I  0  -I  19  I.  -S  13
TV  Loudspeakers(9O)  3  31  1  31  -2  0  -2  21  13  -40  -16
Audio Svstns(90)  7  31  2  32  -3  -14  -17  37  10  -24  -a
Siele-sided  PChS(90!  4  31  2  32  -4  -6  -10  61  t  -35  -13
Step  Motors(")  8  25  23  -5  -22  -26  30  10  -I0  11
BIN  and Color TVs(90)  3  36  0  37  -I  -25  -26  42  5  -35  -27
Electronic  Tuners(90)  1  34  0  34  -3  -23  -26  61  13  -46  -14
Auto Electricals(931)  17  24  7  31  -6  -32  -38  29  4  -24  -2
2-N Shock  Asorbers(94)  3  26  1  27  -2  0  -2  21  9  -17  4
Averagelweighted)  15.4  29.5  4.4  32.9  7.4  -19.6  -26.4  25.2
Averaqe(plaOia  10.1  28.0  3.6  31.7  -6.4  -16.4  -22.5  35.9  9.8  -25.0  0.4
Variance  75.1.  24.4  12.9  13.1  30.2  164.2  2  37.8  279.3  32.9  303.6  467.S
31  32  31  31  23  23  23  23  23  23  23
Potential Euport
6Gucose(31)  7  19  4  22  -2  0  -2  -12  10  3  29
61,cose(38)  3  19  - 2  i22
Nitric  Acid(60/61)  14  12  10  22  -7  -:  -31  -17  9  25  s5
Alusinu  Extrusions(75)  1  29  0  29
Aluminua  Foi1(75)  15  30  4  34  .- 2  0  -2  6  3  -16  -5
Bearings(77)  17  10  13  23  -11  .- 6  -17  -13  14  25  67
XLPE  CiblesiB5)  41  14  31  45  -17  -11  -27  -30  20  45  53
Carburettors(93)  16  14  10  24  .7  .5  -11  - 8  12  19  40
..------  . --.---  .__._  .....  ........  ._  .....  -----.  ----  ---  -----...
AVerage(ueighteo)  17.1  19.0  9.1  27.9  -5.5  -3.8  -3.9  -9.0
Averaq(pliil)  15.2  18.4  9.3  27.5  -7.7  -7.9  -15.0  -12.3  11.3  17.7  40.3
VarIance  187.4  49,7  85.2  60.8  27.2  73.1  124.3  114.9  26.6  347.2  561.2
9  9  8  B  6  6  6  ^  6  6  6- 36  -
Nerq&nil  Etport
Tyrgi(Sb)  11  32  . ;5  .i  )  4  51  4  -t:0
Magnetic axnd".l6  S  1'  4  2;  *7  -?7  20  !3  -
rofgingsil/74)  7  33  X  :4  -,  -41  -2  1  9  -.  -4
4Cshim 9 u0hin@1I7?  7  ;2  2  :  °  2  °  '  ;;
Coeeutcr  TermisaIsI9Ol  b  2  '  -1  2  1  99
KIM)90>  . ;;  0  34  1  1  -I  0  :  -29
.....  .....  ....  -----..  .....  ......  .....  ......  .....  -----.  .....  .........  ..  ... .........  ..  ....
rve'aqe.etiqnt,d'  3.5  9  1.6  :4.2  -3.2  ?.S  3.9  40.2
Aberaqelpamn!  b.9  2'S  A.  !1.7  -a  -5.0  -i.9  29.8  3  -.7  13
voln~ce  *1  :4.5  15  lo.  t  . *  2.  3  :  i5  :41.1  ::5.  Sb,  14**
i  o  C  *  o  o  - .. 
Siqnmfican1  Exocrts
'J.lImn'5Sl  '  :9  . 1  -to  -li  1!;  'I  -46  -4
Synthetic varn4j  &  :t  2  a  -4  -I  - 3  16  *;  -4
IOPPFhlol571  14  :9  4  :  !1  0  -11  55  10  4  -
PAlbPt1?)  . :  2  0  -19  -to  92  53  0  ^
"iIel!7)  lb  22  - -1  0  -11  t9  1°  -3  -
WA:lib7)  13  21  :  -15  -14  -23  51  19  -25  :9
Pestmcmdes4b3)  t  11  4  19  3  -5  -9  -10  17  25  ?
W1  AblicilIlmoDrgp(635  12  :;  2  !  -S  -5  -11  51  21  -19  -15
acin"-Tool  I (91l  15  23  S  ;0  -5  0  -5  -2  t  3  17
Powr  mndtoolstI4l  14  17  3  25  -10  0  -10  37  is  ;'7  IS
hainfraaeSoftware  901  I  lt  I  17  -I  0  1  -9  13  17  39
Floppie11002EDUW90)  3  0  !  I  0  0  0  0  it  it  28
Su%  DoIlde93)  13  25  5  30  0  -12  -12  -42  -1I  32  43
............  ......  . -----  -----  . -----  .......  .....  .... .... _.....  ....  ....  ..  ...  ...
AveraieinumqhtPd)  7.4  20.3  !.7  14.1  -4.3  -t.4  -10.7  33.0
Average(plainl  9.5  21.1  ..  25.2  -o  .5  -4.2  -107.  34.1  lb.3  -10.5  15.t
Variance  25.5  tb.5  5.2  5.5  31.9  37.1  51.1  1142.1  :2?.6  691.6  4'1.0
13  1'  :.  13  1.  13  13  13  13  1'  13
Overall Averoqte(wiqhted)  12.7  27.5  ;.9  ;1.  -5.6  -11.1  -16.4  27.7
Overall Averaqelplain)  10.6  25.3  4.3  29.7  -S.3  -10.6  -16.7  ;9°.6  11.6  -15.4  9.7- 37  -
UPUCT3  Of pU D TAAlf  Clm  ON  CUl, Cob, C  IM IVIM  AN  MS  PIITAILITY,  IV  ClEtl  mIII! 11
__,_,_,_  ..................  . ..............  . _......................  ..............  .---
on  VaF  irataton  de#  to  DOetic
Eat  1  mt0r(POdrKtl  .3111  CNPII)  propoted  torif:4 ons  NMPMI)  P11I1  Profitakility(1 O salts)  of
Htat"  .--  --  . . ---  ....----  . ..............  .............  .......  ....  ..................
_Inut  VA  Total  CapitIl Interaite  .th  Ds  istac  lnternatioeal Price
Impact  Impact  Suds  Inputs  PriCo FuIlCost  MargICost
iluVV  O,oucalsi
NE  hpuelsc;60/61  5  34  I  35  -3  .7  -13  54  54  12  -34  -21
NI  hta  lIe1(b
71  1  25  i  31  -9  -31  -40  37  37  5  -30  It
NE  EPIb  her  17)  15  29  4  33  -10  -5  -15  53  53  t  -43  -S
NIE  ANA7)  3  29  1  29  -5  -10  -15  41  42  13  -42  -19
II  AIA 4110issl47)  17  24  7  31  -0  -4  -53  24  24  5  -1S  14
NI  3167)  14  32  3  35  -4  -21  -30  47  47  a  -St  -4
Cmldapeert  litrif  kid(0/41)  14  12  10  22  -7  -25  -31  -17  -17  4  25  *11
Eaptr  P4141/67)  3  20  2  22  0  -11  -13  92  123  53  0  214
Isptr  NA411147)  14  22  7  29  -13  0  -13  44  33  19  -46  -19
Esptr  A161/U47)  13  21  4  23  -15  -14  -23  53  53  10  -25  24
AVOW lziptel  d  12.2  25.4  4.5  30.0  -7.3  -23.4  -30.4  50.9  57. 
Aeape (lpi.)  11.6  24.7  4.7  29.5  -7.9  -17.7  -25.3  47.4  51.4  14.8  -25.3  7.1
15  10  10  10  10  10  iS  10  10  10  10  10
Systhotic  Testilel
if  PFt(4l)  17  22  '  29  -27  -37  -40  7  7  23  23  44
11  (IY451  SI  30  5  31  -7  -20  -27  49  44  I  -4  -27
E  T1  145)  25  24  0  35  -11  -27  130  27  27  3  -17  9
sptr  Syttietlc VeiralU  4  24  2  23  -4  -1  -5  34  34  14  -14  5
__--  - - --  -----  ..  ._____..  ...... __...__._
AVUI  I(eighted)  20.0  24.1  7.5  32.2  -17.0  -23.5  -43.7  21.7  21.7
Averw  aeplai)  19.6  24.0  4.5  32.5  -12.3  -21.3  -32.3  29.8  24.5  13.3  -14.0  13.3
4  4  4  4  4  4  *  4  4  4  4  4
Basic  Steel Prodcts:
;.  SPK.Stf*l  CAsts173/74)  13  27  4  31
ME  Forgings(73174)  2  24  1  25
NE  Coldill  CoilsI73/74)  0  33  0  33
NE  Steel  TubuI731/741  21  24  5  33
NE  Iron  Pip.s(73/74)  21  22  10  31  -3  -9  -17  3  9  12  5  22
NE  Coated  StoolllSeets(73/74)  13  34  1  37  -3  -24  -24  42  42  2  -40  -26
Urgin.Empt  ForginqsI73/74)  7  33  I  34  -7  -21  -26  54  54  9  -42  -4
------  -----  -----
AVERAE  (weighted)  12.2  31.7  2.4  34.1  -4.2  -21.4  -24.3  38.1  33.1
Average  (plain)  11.0  25.4  3.4  32.0  -4.0  -1I.0  -23.7  35.3  35.3  7.7  -25.7  -2.'
7  7  7  7  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
Electronicsl
NE  TV  Loudspeakers(W)  3  31  I  31  -2  0  -2  21  13  -40  -14
NE  Audio  Systes(90  7  31  2  32  -3  -14  -17  37  10  -24  -9
NE  Single-sided  P7U(9  4  31  I  32  -4  -4  -10  41  14  -35  -13
NE  Stoep  Notoril  1  25  3  28  -5  -22  -24  30  10  -19  11
NE  W and ulwrtVs(W  )  3  34  0  37  -1  -25  -24  42  5  -35  -27
NE  Electronic  Tueers40  1  34  0  34  -3  -23  -24  48  13  -44  -14
NIE  EPAlIsIKI  2  23  1  24  -I  0  -I  19  1l  -9  13
argin.Expt  Coeutar  Torsisals(90l  4  30  2  31  -2  -4  -11  I  11  a  29
argia.Empt  PCrl  O0  2  33  0  34  -1  0  -I  20  4  -21  -14
Exptr  MaiunfraaestS ootre  1  14  1  17  -1  0  -I  -9  13  17  39
Exptr  FlIoppi"eHW 1)(90)  3  0  I  1  0  0  0  0  1I  11  23
AVRASE  (wighted)  2.1  23.2  0.4  24.2  -1.2  -3.4  -9.7  21.5
Aerage  (plal  1*3.4  24.4  1.1  27.4  -2.1  -4.0  -11.0  27;2  11.3  -10.1  2.5
11  It  11  11  11  It  If  11  1  1  1- 38  -
food  laduostriagi
NE  Saybea  0il(3)  2  34  0  36
cotliEnport  61atoIl0  1)  3  i9  2  21
CouldE:port  61u01eM3)  7  19  4  22  -2  0  -2  -12  10  8  29
Exptr  VAnRIIin311  )  7  29  2  31  -1l  0  -16  113  31  -48  -4
.-------  - ---  ------  ----  .......  ._. ....  .....  . ....  ---
AVERIAE  (ueightud)  4.b  2t.0  1.5  29.2  -4.0  0.0  -4.0  6.0
Average  (plain)  4.8  t  5.3  2.0  27.5  -9.0  0.0  -9Q0  50.5  0. 5  -20.0  12.5
4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2  2  2
Niscellanous  Industrius:
NE  Pager(52N  36  2  6
dargin.Empt  Tyrost5)  11  2  5  -4  0  -4  51  4  -46  -20
Ezptr DMP  Film(57)  14  29  4  33  -i  0  -11  55  10  -48  -9
NE  PVC  T.l?57)  0  23  0  23
NE  Plst  - Profiln(57l  6  31  I  33  -2  -2  -4  40  5  -33  -a
_---------  . ....  . ----  ...  ...  ----  ---.---  ---  ...  ..
AVERAliE  bo:9hted)  9.6  31.'  1.9  34.5  -4.1  0.0  -4.2  50.9
Averaeq  Ilain  6.6  30.2  1.4  32.0  -5.7  -0.7  -6.3  48.7  6.3  -42.3  -12.3
5  5  5  5  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
Light  Chb.icals
Exotr  Petticidui(63)  6  13  4  13  -3  -5  -9  -10  17  25  50
Ezptr No  Aspicilial(Drug  (65)  12  33  2  35  -6  -5  -11  51  21  -13  -IS
Margio.Expt  Napetic  Oxids(681  9  19  4  23  -7  0  -7  20  It  -5  33
_ _  _  . .---  --  ...  ...  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  - - _  . _  - --  -
AVERAE  (waghted)  7.2  19.1  3.6  23.2  -5.1  -3.0  -3.6  13.3
Average  (plain)  8.7  21.7  3  25.3  -5.3  -3.3  -9.0  20.3  13.7  0.7  22.7
-3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
Other  Enginwring  Industraie:
CouldEuport  A ueinua  Estrusions(75)  1  29  0  29
CouldEgoort  Aluuinwa  Foill75)  15  30  4  34  -2  0  -2  t  3  -16  -5
CouldEupert  heringq.77  17  10  13  23  -11  -6  -17  -13  14  25  67
Exptr  Nachine-Tools(Il)  15  23  6  30  -5  0  -5  -2  6  -3  17
Exptr  Poer Handtools(84)  14  17  9  S5  -10  0  -10  37  15  -17  15
CouldEnport  ILPE  CablnI3S)  48  14  31  45  -17  -11  -27  -30  20  45  53
ME  Jolly  FillId CablIs(85)  12  25  4  30  -6  -16  -22  21  14  -4  14
ME  Batteri  n(8)  25  23  10  34
NE  Flwortis.  Lamos(17)  21  le  12  29  -13  0  -13  13  it  -3  31
Mirgin.ELpt  Washing  %chlnuist7)  7  32  2  33  -2  0  -2  29  5  -23  -13
NE  Auto  Electricals(13)  17  24  7  31  -b  -2  -33  29  4  -24  -2
CouldExport  Cirburettors193)  16  14  10  24  -7  -5  -11  -,  12  19  40
Esptr  Bus  Bodies(93)  13  25  5  30  0  -12  -12  -42  -13  32  43
NE  2-  Shkck  Absothers(14)  3  26  1  27  -2  0  -2  23  9  -17  4
AVERAIE  (uighted)  11.3  23.2  7.7  30.7  -6.5  -5.3 -12.1  6.3
Averge  i(plain)  14.0  22.1  8.1  30.3  -6.8  -6e. -13.4  5.7  7.9  0.3  22.  0
14  14  14  14  12  12  12  12  12  12  12
lnttrD diatas  lnputi
AVERAIE(wighitd)  15.0  26.8  4.9  31.7  -9,6  -24.6  -33.2  23.4  41.3
AVERME(plain)  13.0  26.2  4.7  30.9  -9.6  - 9.,  -26.7  41.1  43.3  13.2  -22.7  6.9
Final Eeods
AVERA8E(voightd)  11.0  24.3  3.4  29.1  -4.5  -3.6  -9.3  20.4
AVERMU  E  pi  an)  9.2  24.9  4.1  29.9  -5.0  -4.2  -11.2  21.3  10.3  -11.5  11.2
OVERALL  AVEAIEl(zwltd)  12.7  25.0  3.8  29.1  -5.9  -9.6  -15.4  25.5
OVERALL  AVERAMEIpAin  10.6  25.3  4.3  29.7  -6.3  -10.6  -16.7  23.1  11.6  4  9.7- 39  - GRHS  1  and  2
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